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ABSTRACT
This essay provides an overview of the central theoretical law and economics insights concerning
antidiscrimination law across a variety of contexts including discrimination in labor markets, housing
markets, consumer purchases, and policing. The different models of discrimination based on animus,
statistical discrimination, and cartel exploitation are analyzed for both race and sex discrimination.
I explore the theoretical arguments for prohibiting private discriminatory conduct and illustrate the
tensions that exist between concerns for liberty and equality. I also discuss the critical point that one
cannot automatically attribute observed disparities in various economic or social outcomes to
discrimination, and illustrate the complexities in establishing the existence of discrimination. The
major empirical findings showing the effectiveness of federal law in the first decade after passage









This essay provides an overview of the central theoretical law and economics insights 
and empirical findings concerning antidiscrimination law across a variety of contexts 
including discrimination in labor markets, housing markets, consumer purchases, and 
policing.  The different models of discrimination based on animus, statistical 
discrimination, and cartel exploitation are analyzed for both race and sex discrimination.  
I explore the theoretical arguments for prohibiting private discriminatory conduct in light 
of the tensions that exist between concerns for liberty and equality.  I also discuss the 
complexities in empirically establishing the existence of discrimination and highlight the 
critical point that one cannot automatically attribute observed disparities in various 
economic or social outcomes to discrimination.  The major empirical findings showing 
the effectiveness of federal law in the first decade after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act are contrasted with the generally less optimistic findings from more recent 
antidiscrimination interventions.   
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The last century of world history has been marred by episodes of appalling 
mistreatment of various racial, ethnic, and religious groups.
1  While the acts of 
discrimination against and mistreatment of women around the world may have been less 
visible, their consequences have been even more arithmetically compelling if one credits 
Amartya Sen’s conclusion that 100 million women are missing.
2  In this country, the 
horrors of slavery and the Civil War ultimately led to the first great body of American 
antidiscrimination law, which was followed by a century of rigid racial discrimination in 
the Jim Crow South.  The evils of the Holocaust gave considerable impetus to the 
emergence of the second great body of antidiscrimination law after World War II when 
New York and New Jersey became the first states to prohibit discrimination in 
employment.  In the ensuing decades, most states followed their lead.   
The final phase of expanding federal antidiscrimination law began with the 
adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  This federal ban on discrimination, which 
played a critical role in dismantling the rigid discriminatory social order of the South, is 
                                                 
1 See Power (2002).  Turkey's killing of nearly one million Armenians, the Nazi’s killing of six million 
Jews, Iraq's slaughter of more than one hundred thousand Kurds, Bosnian Serbs' murder of some two 
hundred thousand Muslims and Croats, and the Rwandan Hutu’s slaughter of 800,000 Tutsi -- among the 
most horrific events of the last century -- were all motivated or aggravated by racial/ethnic/religious 
antagonism. 
2 Sen (1990) claims this is primarily because women have not received comparable care to men in health, 
medicine, and nutrition.  Oster (2005) argues that perhaps half of this shortfall is due not to discrimination 
but to an unusual effect of prevalent Hepatitis B virus that results in a greater percentage of male births 
(perhaps because of higher miscarriage rates of female fetuses).    3
now used to regulate an enormous array of social practices from the workplace and 
schools to public accommodations and policing.  Other important developments in the 
federal effort to dismantle southern racial segregation were the Supreme Court’s rejection 
of the separate but equal doctrine in Brown v. Bd. of Education (1954) and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.  Antidiscrimination law has been growing dramatically in scope for 
at least the last half century, and has revolutionized the American conception of the 
proper role of government.
3 
Today, most Americans -- and virtually all public officials -- have embraced 
prohibitions on discrimination as an important constraint on both private contracting 
and public action.  Moreover, even as issues such as a ban on discrimination against 
gays and certain types of affirmative action have generated opposition, the reach of 
antidiscrimination law has never been greater. 
The growth in the scope of antidiscrimination law can be seen in the language of 
Section 12920 of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), which states: 
  
It is hereby declared as the public policy of this state that it is necessary to 
protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, 
obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on 
account of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical 
disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or 
sexual orientation. 
 
When employers are not subject to such legal restrictions, advertisements seeking 
workers described along these precise characteristics – such as “young, white females” or 
“married, white male” – are abundant.  In 1960, American newspapers were full of such 
now-prohibited advertisements, and in areas of the world that don’t have 
antidiscrimination laws such ads are common today.
4  The growing power of 
antidiscrimination law in the United States represents a dramatic rejection of classical 
liberal notions of freedom of contract.  Again, Section 12920 of California’s FEHA offers 
the following, sweeping rationale for the legal prohibition: 
 
It is recognized that the practice of denying employment opportunity and 
discriminating in the terms of employment for these reasons foments 
domestic strife and unrest, deprives the state of the fullest utilization of its 
capacities for development and advancement, and substantially and 
adversely affects the interest of employees, employers, and the public in 
general. 
 
The California statute goes on to set forth a similarly long list of prohibited bases for 
actions concerning housing accommodations (excluding the prohibition on age 
discrimination while adding a prohibition based on familial status).  Many states have 
                                                 
3 For further materials on the issues raised in this paper, see Donohue (2003). 
4 See Darity and Mason (1998).  For example, want ads seeking candidates specified by race/ethnicity, 
gender and age are published online in the classifieds of the New Straits Times in Malaysia, which has no 
law prohibiting private employment discrimination in a country that is roughly 1/3 Bumiputra (ethnic 
Malay and religiously Muslim), 1/3 Indian, and 1/3 Chinese.   4
responded to tobacco industry lobbying and now prohibit “discrimination” against 
cigarette smokers,
5 and a few jurisdictions even ban discrimination on the basis of all 
physical characteristics.
6  With crime dropping sharply throughout the United States in 
the 1990s, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) launched a major campaign 
against discrimination in policing – so-called “racial profiling” – which was gaining wide 
support, at least until the events of 9/11 rekindled the argument that some types of 
profiling might serve useful law enforcement functions.
7   Meanwhile, lawsuits 
challenging discriminatory practices in mortgage lending, housing practices, insurance 
sales, and the financing of automobiles have been prominent elements of the attack on 
allegedly discriminatory business practices.  
Judged by any measure of legal significance, American antidiscrimination law has 
continued to grow in importance.  It has assumed a large place in current domestic legal 
consciousness and has been a major legal export as other countries have emulated the 
U.S. legal prohibitions.  Another noteworthy reflection of the importance of this topic is 
the caliber of the contributors to the scholarship in this area -- the Nobel economists 
alone include Gary Becker, Kenneth Arrow, Milton Friedman, George Akerlof, Amartya 
Sen and James Heckman.  Within the legal academy, major contributions have come 
from many top law and economics scholars, including Richard Posner, Robert Cooter, 
Richard Epstein, Ian Ayres, and Christine Jolls.  While a simple vision of animus-based 
discrimination, which Becker fashioned into the first economic theory of employment 
discrimination, has motivated elected officials and the public to support an elaborate 
body of law committed to the eradication of “discrimination” against an ever-widening 
group of claimants, the issue is far too multi-faceted and the nature of the protected 
classes far too diverse to be adequately encompassed by a single theoretical framework.  
In addition, the goals of antidiscrimination law have evolved: initially, legal and 
economic notions of “discrimination” were broadly compatible, but over time an 
increasingly expansive legal conception of discrimination has come into greater conflict 
                                                 
5 Finkin (1996) describes the recent trend as follows: 
 
Employers commonly forbid drinking on the job and, more recently, prohibit smoking on the 
premises. But some employers have gone much further, and refuse to hire or retain employees 
who drink or smoke at all, in an effort to reduce medical insurance costs attendant to such 
behavior. Unlike many of the other invasions of individual autonomy, these policies have drawn 
the attention of politically influential groups, i.e., the tobacco and alcohol interests. Consequently, 
eighteen states now expressly forbid discrimination on the basis of off-premises use of tobacco; 
one forbids discrimination on the basis of off-premises use of tobacco or alcohol; and six forbid 
discrimination on the basis of off-premises use of any "lawful product." Absent such legislation, 
however, nothing prohibits such employer commands…. Colorado forbids discrimination by 
employers for engagement in "any lawful activity" off the employer's premises and New York 
forbids discrimination for engagement in "legal recreation activities."   
 
Moreover, a new argument designed to protect smokers is that smoking is an addiction protected by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.  While it is doubtful that this argument will prevail, it does underscore the 
continued pressure for extending the reach of American antidiscrimination law. 
6 For example, the city of Santa Cruz has an antidiscrimination ordinance [Chapter 9.83.02(13)] that goes 
beyond the law of California to ban discrimination on the basis of “height, weight or physical 
characteristic.”   
7 As Schauer (2003) notes:  “As a generalization, the principle of treating all equally is a principle that 
ignores real differences—and consequently comes at a price.”   5
with the economic notion of discrimination.  As the ambitions of antidiscrimination law 
have advanced beyond the narrow task of eliminating economic inequities to promote 
broader goals of distributive justice, the costs imposed by the regulatory framework and 
the tensions between the demands of law and the forces of the market have grown.  This 
chapter will address these issues from both a theoretical and empirical basis, while 
shedding light on what antidiscrimination law has accomplished in the past and what it is 
achieving today. 
Section II begins with a brief overview of American antidiscrimination law that 
defines the key legal concepts of disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination, 
and notes the breadth of American social life that is governed by the far-reaching 
regulatory apparatus.  Section III discusses the basic economic theories of discrimination, 
and highlights their virtues and shortcomings.  Section IV then explores the theoretical 
arguments for prohibiting private discriminatory conduct and illustrates the tensions that 
exist between concerns for liberty and equality.  Section V makes the critical point that 
one cannot automatically attribute observed disparities in various economic or social 
outcomes to discrimination, and Section VI illustrates the complexities in establishing the 
existence of discrimination.  Section VII discusses some practical problems with 
antidiscrimination law, revolving around the difficulties of motive-based litigation and 
the dangers of Type I and Type II error as well as the costs of preventing the use of 
efficient statistical discrimination.  Section VIII then discusses some of the major 
empirical studies evaluating the impact of antidiscrimination law.  One important 
message from this literature is that the initial adoption of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act aided black economic welfare but that further efforts to strengthen federal 
antidiscrimination law have been subject to the law of diminishing returns.  Section IX 
discusses the evidence on whether antidiscrimination law has aided female workers, 
examines the data on premarket factors that may influence female labor outcomes, and 
describes the development of one particular strand of the ban on sex discrimination – 
harassment on the basis of sex.  The literature on discrimination in mortgage lending and 
major consumer markets is outlined in Section X.  Section XI discusses “racial profiling” 
in policing, and Section XII concludes. 
 
II. THE CONTOURS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
 
Since the various legislative mandates against “discrimination” generally offer 
little further guidance on what those prohibitions mean, the development of the precise 
contours of antidiscrimination law over the last half century has largely been the product 
of judicial decision-making.  For example, the prohibition embodied in Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act was initially thought to extend only to intentional employment 
discrimination, or so-called “disparate treatment” discrimination.  The courts would ask 
whether the plaintiff would have been treated differently if he or she did not have the 
particular trait in question.
8  In the 1971 case of Griggs v. Duke Power, the Supreme 
Court fashioned an additional and potentially more sweeping theory of discrimination.  
This so-called “disparate impact” doctrine prohibited facially neutral acts that had an 
                                                 
8 One major issue of contention raised by this definition was whether it would prevent employers from 
engaging in voluntary affirmative action that provided some advantage to workers having one of the 
protected characteristics.  This issue will be discussed below.   6
adverse impact on certain protected classes unless the employer could offer a sufficiently 
compelling justification for the practice.  In the workplace, typical practices that might be 
challenged include the use of screening tests for employment or for promotion.  In 
policing, a disparate impact charge might be used to challenge drug enforcement efforts 
that involved targeting certain cars or driving conduct.  Determining what legally 
“justifies” conduct generating a disparate racial or ethnic impact involves some balancing 
of the benefits generated by the practice in question versus the costs to the group that is 
differentially impacted. 
The Supreme Court has held, though, that this disparate impact doctrine is not 
available to litigants who base their claim of discrimination on the Constitution (typically 
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments) or to those suing under Section 1981 of the 
federal code (which provides a remedy only for intentional racial discrimination).
9  One 
or both elements of this disparate treatment/disparate impact structure have been applied 
to legal challenges to discrimination in a large array of different domains: 
 
a. labor markets (Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is the primary 
federal law and most states have similar -- or in states such as 
California, more stringent -- prohibitions.  The major judicial 
expansions were the creation of the disparate impact standard in 
1971 and bringing sexual harassment within the ambit of the 
prohibition of sex discrimination in 1986.
10  The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act represent the two major non-Title VII legislative 
expansions of federal antidiscrimination law, with the latter 
explicitly going beyond the prior notion of prohibiting 
discrimination to mandating that employers provide “reasonable” 
accommodations to “qualified” disabled workers.
11) 
b. education (Title VI prohibits discrimination in any program that 
receives federal funds) 
c. criminal justice and racial profiling (the Fourteenth Amendment and   
Title VI have been used to challenge racially disparate outcomes 
in death penalty cases, drug and traffic enforcement, and street 
policing) 
d. the provision of health care services (Fourteenth Amendment and  
   Title VI) 
                                                 
9 The enduring disagreement within the federal judiciary as to whether the disparate impact doctrine is 
applicable to cases brought under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act has recently been 
answered in the affirmative Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).  The same decision had been 
imposed legislatively in California in 1999. 
10 In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued “Guidelines on Discrimination Because 
of Sex,” which declared sexual harassment a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  These 
guidelines defined two distinct categories of sexual harassment: “quid pro quo” and “hostile environment” 
harassment.  In the 1986 case of Vinson v. Meritor Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that “hostile 
environment” sex harassment violated Title VII.     
11 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 1997 about 52.6 million people (19.7 percent of the population) 
had some type of disability and among those with a disability, 33 million people (12.3 percent of the 
population) had a severe disability.   7
 e.  housing and lending (The Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit  
Opportunity Act) 
 f.  purchase of goods and services (Section 1981 prohibits intentional 
racial discrimination). 
 
  The threat of employment discrimination litigation, along with pressure on federal 
government contractors to comply with the antidiscrimination and affirmative action 
requirements of Executive Order 11422, has led many firms to develop affirmative action 
plans to reduce perceived shortfalls in the employment share of minority and female 
workers.
12  There is an obvious tension between the establishment of a race or gender-
based affirmative action plan and the statutory language of Section 703(m) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which states that “an unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice.” The courts have resolved this 
tension by allowing private employers to grant preferences on race or gender grounds but 
only in the limited circumstances where there is a manifest imbalance in the employer’s 
workforce and any preferential treatment does not unduly burden members of the non-
preferred group.
13  Governmental affirmative action is subject to strict scrutiny under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (or under the Fifth Amendment in 
the case of federal governmental action), and the permissible scope of such affirmative 
action has been defined through a series of Supreme Court decisions.  California has 
adopted a constitutional amendment -- Proposition 209 -- that prohibits any form of 
preferential treatment based on race or gender in state employment or in the operation of 
other state functions, such as education and contracting for construction and other 
services.  Private employers and universities in California are still free to pursue such 
race and gender-based preferences as long as they do not overstep the bounds of federal 
(or state) antidiscrimination law. 
  
III. THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION 
   
Although the contexts in which discrimination is found vary widely, ranging from 
labor markets and health care to housing, education and the purchase of automobiles, the 
reasons for such discrimination are relatively few.  In fact, the implicit internal 
justification of discriminators in any area generally falls into one of four categories: 1) 
“we don’t like you” (aversion) or, what is often functionally equivalent, “we prefer 
someone other than you” (nepotism); 2) “it is in our self-interest to cater to the aversion 
or nepotism of others even though we don’t share those feeling ourselves”; 3) “we can 
further our independent interests by acting to subordinate another group, either because 
such actions enhance our self-esteem or undermine economic competition from your 
group”; and 4) “taking your particular trait into account can help us achieve a legitimate 
goal more effectively.”  As we will see, the first two of these are predicated on certain 
individuals having a “taste” for discrimination, which actually tends to harm the one 
having such a taste, at least if it is being expressed in a competitive market setting.  The 
                                                 
12 See Leonard (1984a), Leonard (1984b), Ashenfelter and Heckman (1976), and Heckman and Wolpin 
(1976).  
13 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).   8
third and fourth categories involve the strategic use of discrimination to further one’s 
own interests, in some cases intentionally imposing burdens on the disadvantaged group 
(Category 3 – the cartel model) and in others simply burdening certain members of the 
group without necessarily harming the group as a whole unless the group’s incentives to 
invest in their human capital is impaired (Category 4 – statistical discrimination). 
To illustrate, the employer who dislikes blacks and therefore refuses to hire black 
applicants or the police officer who stops a black driver out of animus and gives a ticket 
when he would not have done so had the driver been white is engaging in animus-based 
discrimination (Category 1).  The airline that exclusively hires young female flight 
attendants to cater to the preferences of its passengers or the restaurant that hires only 
white servers in response to customer preferences is acceding to the bias or nepotism of 
others (Category 2).  The prototype of Category 3 discrimination was the informal Jim 
Crow restrictions that kept blacks out of the southern textile industry throughout the first 
two-thirds of the 20
th Century.  The drug enforcement agent who finds that using race or 
ethnicity can increase the likelihood of making drug seizures, or the employer who feels 
that such traits are useful proxies for certain productivity-related traits is engaging in 
statistical discrimination (Category 4).  Such behavior, though likely widespread, is 
illegal, whether the stereotypes are accurate or inaccurate. 
Importantly, an actor who doesn’t consider any protected characteristic but who 
acts directly on factors that are universally accepted as legitimate is not engaging in 
discrimination, even if a racial or ethnic disparity emerges.
14  Thus, the FBI reports that 
51 percent of homicide offenders in 2002 were black, while 50 percent of those arrested 
for homicide were black.  Even though only 12.7 percent of the population is black, the 
close correlation between the race of homicide offenders and race of homicide arrestees 
undermines the view that the police are invidiously discriminating in making homicide 
arrests.  Assuming all the arrests are accurate, this is not discrimination by the police.
15  
The next four subsections will discuss the four categories of discrimination in the context 
                                                 
14 Determining what factors constitute “legitimate” bases for action has been complicated since the 
Supreme Court created the disparate impact theory of discrimination.  Disparate impact discrimination, 
which is prohibited in the employment realm by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, involves the use of 
a neutral proxy other than race or some other protected trait.  Because the decision-maker in such 
disparate impact cases is not relying on a directly relevant factor, this conduct differs from my illustration 
of a nondiscriminatory judgment, and because it does not rely directly on race (or other protected trait), it 
differs from my definition of statistical discrimination.  (This distinction can break down if a court allows a 
disparate impact challenge to a subjective employment process that uses only factors “universally accepted 
as legitimate.”) 
15 Of course, the pattern may result from discrimination elsewhere in society, but in a system where 
“discrimination” is often penalized heavily (both in terms of social opprobrium and through monetary 
damages), it is important to be clear about who is -- and is not -- engaging in discriminatory conduct.   
Similarly, the results of the recent New Haven taxi-cab study in Ayres et al. (2005) suggest that black 
drivers receive considerably smaller tips than white drivers.  If this differential accurately reflected 
differences in driver service (for example, less help with bags or knowledge about locations), then there 
would be no discrimination. Instead, the authors conclude the disparity results from the animus-based 
discrimination of taxi passengers.  Note, though, that a system designed to reduce discrimination by 
including tips in the cab fare would help black drivers, while hurting black customers since the latter tended 
to provide lower tips than white customers (which may not be surprising given the links between race and 
income).   9
of employment discrimination, but, as we have just seen, they apply to other contexts as 
well.
16 
   
A.  Employer Discrimination   
  The core understanding of the electorate about the nature of discrimination and 
the motivating dynamic propelling the expanding prohibitions against discrimination has 
consistently been that animus by prejudiced employers is pervasive and seriously harms 
the employment prospects of women and minorities.  According to this view, elderly and 
disabled workers are disadvantaged, not only because on average their age and 
incapacities lower their productivity but also because of irrational bias.  As will be 
discussed below, one of the key features of this type of discrimination is that it burdens 
not only the victim, but also imposes a cost on the discriminator. 
 
1.  The Becker Employer-Animus Model 
Gary Becker’s theory of employer animus-based discrimination attempts to model 
this conception of discrimination by positing that a discriminating employer must bear 
not only the wage, w, when he or she hires a disfavored worker but also pay a 
discriminatory psychic penalty, δ.
17  The following condition should hold for the last 
disfavored worker hired:  mp = w + δ,  (1) where mp is marginal productivity.  Becker’s 
model of the discriminating employer is mathematically equivalent to a case in which the 
government imposes a variable tax on employers who hire workers of a certain group 
(defined by race, gender, or other immutable trait), where the tax ranges from zero (for 
the non-discriminators) to the maximum value M (the value of δ for the most highly 
discriminating employer).
18  Just as an employment tax would be expected to lower the 
quantity demanded and earnings of workers, the psychic “tax” lowers the quantity 
demanded and earnings of disfavored workers.  Of course, if there is enough 
heterogeneity in the population of employers, the actually observed psychic tax should be 
far less than M, since disfavored workers will tend to gravitate to employers who bear a 
smaller (or no) psychic penalty.   
Conversely, the greater the number of disfavored workers in any labor market, the 
greater the observed value of δ will be in that labor market as the marginal disfavored 
workers will have to deal with employers characterized by higher values of δ in order to  
be absorbed into the market.  Indeed, this was one of the primary motivations of Becker’s 
model: it provided an explanation for the greater apparent discriminatory penalty in the 
South without resorting to differences in tastes for discrimination between northern and 
southern employers.  Even if employers in both regions were identical in the extent of 
their racial prejudice, the much higher percentage of black residents in the South meant 
that to find jobs, blacks had to associate with increasingly higher δ employers, leading to 
widening earnings disparities between black and white workers.  The Becker model of 
                                                 
16 The theories and empirical studies discussed in subsequent sections have been chosen for their 
applicability to the functions and forms of antidiscrimination law.  For a more general discussion of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on discrimination, see Altonji and Blank (1999) and Cain (1986). 
17 The variable δ is also known as the discrimination coefficient.   
18 Conceivably, the tax could be negative, suggesting that the relevant group of workers is preferred rather 
than disfavored.  This, then, could be thought of as a model of nepotism (or attraction to workers 
possessing certain non-productivity-related desirable traits).   10
employer animus thus provided an explanation for an important observed phenomenon – 
the greater black-white earnings disparity in the South than the North – without resorting 
to “difference in tastes” as the cause.   
The model also generates a number of other predictions, which can be illustrated 
with the simple supply and demand model of Figure 1.  The intersection of demand curve 
D1 and the supply curve S illustrates the short-term equilibrium for the market for black 
workers in a world without discrimination.  Black workers would earn a wage of W1, and 
Q1 black workers will be hired.  Becker models the introduction of employer 
discrimination by positing a downward shift in the demand curve to D2 (which, as a way 
of reflecting the higher “cost” of black workers, could alternatively be modeled as a 
pseudo-upward shift in the supply curve, as indicated by equation (1) above – see 
Donohue (1986) and Donohue (1989)).  In this simple case, it is assumed that the vertical 
distance AC reflects the uniform psychic penalty associated with hiring black workers.  
The consequence of this discriminatory animus is that fewer blacks would be hired (only 
Q2 instead of Q1) and black wages would fall from W1 to W2.  Thus, at least in the short-
run, the Becker model predicts that the disfavored group will experience job losses and 
receive lower pay relative to the non-discriminatory equilibrium given by point A in 
Figure 1. 
As Donohue (1987) underscored, the Becker model predicts that discriminating 
employers are hurt by their discriminatory preference in that their net profit (monetary 
minus psychic penalty) is actually larger in the non-discriminatory world than in the 
discriminatory world.
19  Note, too, that in the example illustrated in Figure 1, while the 
discriminatory employer’s net benefit is lower, this employer’s total monetary reward is 
greater (because the entire psychic cost denoted by AC represents money that ends up in 
the pocket of the discriminator).  In summary, the presence of discrimination can cost 
jobs and money to the disfavored group and increase income inequality as black earnings 
fall and the monetary profits of discriminators rise (even as their total psychic welfare 
declines).  One might use these conclusions as the basis for constructing an equity 
argument for prohibiting employer animus-based discrimination.  In this case, equity 
would be defined by reference to the non-discriminatory equilibrium, and thus legal 
efforts to move closer to that equilibrium would be defined as promoting equity.
20  
Conversely, if one were willing to value all preferences expressed in the market and no 
others (as many economists are inclined to do), then any attempt of law to move away 
from the discriminatory equilibrium would undermine efficiency (since the efficient 
solution would be defined by intersection B in Figure 1).  If preferences for redistribution 
or racial justice (or against racial discrimination) are honored, however, then 
                                                 
19 Note that the “employer surplus” is the area under the demand curve above the relevant wage.  Clearly, 
this is lower for demand curve D2 than for demand curve D1. 
20 Note that this is not the customary equity argument based on the perceived social benefit of enhancing 
the wealth of the least well off members of society, although coincidentally this value may be served by 
antidiscrimination policy because of the lower wealth of women and minorities.  For this reason, taxes and 
transfers, which are generally preferred to the use of the legal system as a way to redistribute wealth may 
not be appropriately targeted to achieve the non-discriminatory equilibrium.  Still, it is possible that tax 
incentives to hire women and minorities might be a more efficient mechanism to reach the non-
discriminatory equilibrium at least cost (in light of the not inconsiderable costs of a litigation-based 
antidiscrimination regime in which difficult issues of motives must be determined by judges and juries).   11
antidiscrimination law can have a role.
21  Note that the Becker model assumes away any 
possible harm to victims other than lost wages.  Since juries now routinely award 
compensatory damages in addition to back pay to victims of discrimination, this suggests 
that the dishonor or psychological costs of discrimination are deemed to be significant. 
An important conclusion from the Becker model is that, if there are enough non-
discriminatory employers around, disfavored workers may not suffer any monetary 
penalty.  In this event, blacks would work for the non-discriminators and would be paid 
equally to white workers working for the discriminatory employers.  Thus, even in the 
presence of discriminatory attitudes by some employers, effective discrimination (in 
terms of lower black wages and employment) may be eliminated by the operation of the 
market, albeit by encouraging the segregation of workers.  Correspondingly, mandated 
segregation will increase the Beckerian psychic costs of discrimination by increasing the 
interaction between discriminatory employers and disfavored workers. 
 
  2.  An Empirical Challenge to the Becker Model 
Note that we have been discussing the short-run predictions of the Becker model, 
which at first would appear to explain lower black wages and employment -- at least for 
the case of the Jim Crow South and the discrimination confronted by southern black 
workers prior to the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  But what would happen in 
the long run under the Becker model?  The market should discipline such discriminators, 
and, at least under constant returns to scale, should ultimately drive out the 
discriminators.  For this reason, Milton Friedman argued that legal prohibitions on 
discrimination in employment would be unnecessary since the market would solve the 
problem.  But this is where the Becker employer-animus model ran into problems.  It 
failed to explain the enduring exclusion of blacks from entire industries in which they 
were fully capable of performing the work.
22  In the competitive market that Becker 
premised, the cost to discriminators of forsaking talented black workers should have 
engendered a painful market response, ultimately leading to the elimination of the 
discriminators if the employers operated in a world of constant returns to scale. Indeed, 
Kenneth Arrow observed that Becker had developed a theory of employment 
discrimination that “predicts the absence of the phenomenon it was designed to 
explain.”
23  Becker anticipated Arrow’s point by asserting that the shortage of 
                                                 
21 One can craft a theoretical argument based on the Coase Theorem that in a zero transactions cost world, 
one would expect discrimination to be banned if the costs of discrimination exceeded their benefits.  In this 
calculus, the preferences of those who are offended by racism and other forms of prejudice would be 
weighed fully.  The outcome would then depend on whether the victims of discrimination and those who 
decried their plight would be willing and able to compensate those who gained from discrimination.  The 
operation of free labor markets in a discriminatory environment will not reveal the answer to this empirical 
question since transactions costs will prevent the opponents of discrimination from contracting with the 
discriminators.  (Query whether in practice an effort to bargain for respect will ipso facto be futile, since a 
Coasean payment to induce someone to respect the payer in itself undermines the payer’s sense of self-
worth.  Of course, this problem can always be elided by considering it to be a violation of the zero 
transactions costs assumption.)   
22 Heckman and Payner (1989) note that blacks were largely excluded from the low-skill southern textile 
industry for the entire 20
th Century -- until the effective date of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  I 
analyzed the strengths of this article in Donohue (2002). 
23 Arrow (1972).     12
entrepreneurial skill prevented the elimination of the discriminating employers.
24  This 
claim is unpersuasive, though, since very little talent was needed to see that blacks could 
be hired at lower cost into low-skilled industries such as textiles.  Yet this never 
happened until Title VII took effect.  Clearly, Title VII and not some newfound 
entrepreneurial talent explains the large gains of blacks in the decade from 1965 to 1975 
(as discussed in Section VIII (A) below). 
Thus, while Becker’s theory of employer animus generated some useful 
predictions, it failed to explain perhaps the key feature of racial discrimination in the 
South -- its relentless persistence in excluding black workers from entire industries over 
more than half a century.  Nor can the employer model explain another common 
characteristic of the pre-Title VII world -- occupational segregation (as opposed to 
segregation across firms).   
 
3.  Is the Becker Model Undermined By Positive Search Costs? 
Black (1995) attempts to address the empirical inadequacies of the Becker 
employer model of discrimination by introducing search costs into the analysis of 
discrimination.  Black relaxes the assumptions of frictionless hiring and perfect 
competition to conclude that victims of discrimination may not be protected from 
earnings discrimination even when numerous nondiscriminating firms are present.  Two 
assumptions about market behavior drive Black’s model: workers participate in a costly 
search process and employers have some degree of monopsonistic power.  In the 
population of available workers, some portion λ is male (m) and the other 1 – λ is female 
(f).
25  Members of each group have a reservation utility Uj (j = m, f) that they compare to 
wage offers from firms, which are labeled prejudiced (p) or unprejudiced (u).  Prejudiced 
firms, with market share θ, are known to employ only men at the wage 
m
p w  while 
unprejudiced firms with market share 1 – θ employ both men and women at wages,
m
u w  
and
f
u w , respectively.  Total utility for workers is the sum of wages received plus some 
non-pecuniary job satisfaction parameter 
j
k α (k = u, p).  This value, which for instance 
measures the success in matching individuals to occupation, is a random variable with 
cumulative distribution function F(α) and density f(α).
26  For ease of exposition, let α be 
distributed uniformly over the unit rectangle.   
  The essence of the Black (1995) model is the search process involved in matching 
workers with employers.  When considering employment at a particular firm, a worker 
accepts a wage offer whenever
j
k w  ≥ Uj – 
j
k α .  If a match does not take place, the worker 
incurs cost C.  In equilibrium, the marginal worker will be indifferent between accepting 
a job and continuing search.  For men, this condition yields the equation: 
 
                                                 
24 Becker (1968). 
25 Black’s model, although formulated here in terms of sex discrimination, applies to any type of 
preference-based discrimination on the part of the employer. 
26 In order to ensure that second order conditions are satisfied, the hazard function f(α)/[1 – F(α)] must be 
strictly decreasing.     13
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Equation (3) states that the cost of search must equal its expected benefits, or the net gain 
derived from employment at either a u or p firm weighted by the probability of meeting 
that firm type.  According to equation (3), the derivative of Um with respect to
m
p w is θ and 
with respect to
m
u w is (1 – θ), which means that reservation utility increases with wage 
offers but at a lower rate than the wage increase.   
  Women, however, can gain no utility from visits to prejudiced firms since such 
firms refuse to hire them.  Therefore, their equilibrium condition is characterized by: 
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The comparative statics of equation (5) again imply that reservation utility increases with 
the wage offer, but now on a one-for-one basis.  However, an increase in the number of 
prejudiced firms (given by θ) reduces reservation utility.  The intuition for this result is 
that a higher share of prejudiced firms increases search costs for women, which allows 
unprejudiced firms to offer a lower wage and still attract female employees.  
Unprejudiced firms therefore enjoy some degree of monopsonistic power due to the 
costly search process.   
  Turning to the employer’s decision, let V denote the marginal product of labor, 
which is assumed to be the same for men and women.  Then, an unprejudiced firm’s 
expected profit per applicant is given by: 
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and profit maximization entails a wage offer of: 
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and will offer the wage: 
 
( ) 1 5 . 0 − + =
m m
p U V w           ( 1 0 )  
 
Constant returns to scale ensure that wage offers are equalized for men across firm types, 
which in turn equates the “male” profits of prejudiced and unprejudiced employers.  
From Equations (8) and (10) we see that wages increase by one half for a unit increase in 
either male or female reservation utility.  However, so long as there is at least one 
prejudiced firm, the negative effect of their presence on women’s reservation utility 
guarantees that w
f < w
m.  Thus, even when workers are equally productive, the existence 
of any employers harboring taste-based discrimination against a minority group (or 
women) will result in lower earnings for the members of that group – whether or not they 
work for non-prejudiced employers.
27 
 
  4.  Will Increased Competition Reduce Labor Market Discrimination? 
For both the Becker employer discrimination model and the Black search cost 
model, one would expect greater competition would dampen the degree of labor market 
discrimination.  This claim has recently been invoked as part of an argument in support of 
globalization.  Specifically, Jagdish Bhagwati’s latest book In Defense of Globalization 
considers the impact of greater world economic integration on the fortunes of women by 
posing the question: “has globalization accentuated, or has it been corrosive of, the 
discriminations against women that many of us deplore and wish to destroy?”  Bhagwati 
answers this question by arguing that increased trade flows tend to narrow the male - 
female wage gap.   
  According to Becker’s theory of the taste for discrimination, the decision to hire a 
male rather than a female of equal or greater potential productivity places the firm at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to its counterparts.  In an autarkic world, uniform taste 
discrimination will not affect the home country, since all firms are making hiring 
decisions in the same way.  However, once foreign trade is allowed, the forces of external 
competition reduce the viability of such prejudice since relative productivity now matters.  
Thus, “[t]he gender wage gap will then narrow in the industries that must compete with 
imports produced by unprejudiced firms elsewhere.” In general, Bhagwati notes, 
competition, regardless of its source, will elevate the price to the firm of indulging in 
                                                 
27 Duleep and Zalokar (1991) had previously observed that even if we do see equalization of gross wages, if 
minorities have to search harder, then the cost of discrimination shows up as lower net wages including 
search costs.    15
prejudiced behavior.  As a result, “all fat [must] be removed from the firm” and the wage 
gap will contract.   
  Bhagwati cites Black and Brainerd (2002) as empirical validation of this theory.  
Specifically, they report that American firms that experienced an 
openness/competitiveness shock displayed a faster decline in their gender wage gap. 
Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1977 through 1994, the authors try to 
proxy the degree of discrimination against women by computing a “gender wage gap” for 
63 industry groupings.
28   The authors then estimate the following equation: 
 
∆(ln(wage)xm - ln(wage)xω) = α + β∆tradex + γconcenx + ψ(trade*concen)x    (11) 
 
where the dependent variable is the change in the residual gender wage gap, trade is the 
import share and concen is an indicator of whether in 1977 the industry was concentrated 
(i.e., had a four-firm concentration ratio of at least .4).  Using the measure of the residual 
gender wage gap reduces confounding from other sources of variation in earnings such as 
education and labor market experience.  Estimation of equation (11) focuses on the 
coefficient on the trade-concentration interaction term, which is found, as hypothesized, 
to be negative and statistically significant.  The authors conclude that “a 10 percentage 
point increase in import share in a concentrated industry would lead to a 6.6 percent 
decline in the residual gender wage gap.” 
Black and Brainerd’s paper constitutes evidence that increased competition, in 
this case engineered by increased trade, can narrow discriminatory wage gaps.
29  I am 
skeptical, though, that the U.S. gender wage gap narrowed because of “imports produced 
by unprejudiced firms elsewhere,” since many of our trading partners over this period 
were much less oriented towards womens’ rights than we were.  But note that even if 
employers in a country such as China are biased against women, the competitive pressure 
that their lower wage structure puts on U.S. firms gives American employers an incentive 
not to pass up lower cost but equally productive female workers.  (The pressure would 
presumably be greater still if the Chinese employers were not discriminating against 
women since their costs would be even lower, but competition from low-cost producers 
should discipline American discriminators in any event).   
If the Black and Brainerd study is correct, then two conclusions follow:  (1) there 
was considerable discrimination against women more than a decade after Title VII was 
enacted and (2) increased international trade following 1977 eliminated some portion of 
the discriminatory male-female wage gap differentially across the 63 industry 
                                                 
28 Black and Brainerd (2002) describes the derivation of the gender wage gap, the within-year earnings 
disparity between men and women at the industry level, as follows: 
 
The log wage is first regressed on four categorical education variables, age, age squared, and a 
non-white dummy variable; this regression is estimated for the pooled sample of men and women 
in each year of interest.  The residual gender wage gap is then generated as the difference in the 
average residual wage for men and women, calculated at the industry- or MSA-level.   
29 Query whether the Black and Brainerd results suggest that men earned rents in concentrated industries 
and that increased competition from trade dissipated these rents, leading to an observed shrinking of the 
male-female earnings disparity.   16
groupings.
30  I suspect, however, that the black-white earnings gaps did not narrow in the 
same fashion.  If this surmise is correct, then either there was less discrimination against 
blacks by 1977 or Bhagwati’s claim needs to be refined. 
Neither the Becker model of animus-based employer discrimination nor the Black 
search cost model can explain the enduring exclusion of blacks in the southern labor 
market from entire industries, such as textiles. The following sections will discuss three 
rival theories to the notion of employer animus to explore whether these other types of 
discrimination better explain the empirical evidence of the past or present.   
 
B.  Customer and Fellow-Worker Discrimination 
The first alternative theory of discrimination, also originally crafted by Becker, 
posits that discrimination emanates not from the employer but from customers and fellow 
workers.  This model has very different implications from the employer animus model in 
that the market tends to punish employer animus but clearly rewards efforts to 
accommodate the discriminatory preferences of customers and fellow workers.  This 
model would seem to have at least one major advantage over the employer animus model 
since it can explain an enduring pattern of discrimination.  Several recent papers have 
tested empirically for customer discrimination and found evidence of unequal treatment 
for minorities.
31  The most basic theoretical formulation of customer discrimination posits 
that buyers in the prejudiced group base their decisions on an adjusted price p(1 + δ) for 
minority sellers, where δ again represents the discrimination coefficient.  Realizing this, 
firm managers will attempt to assign minorities to jobs with the least amount of customer 
contact.  In the polar case in which labor is perfectly mobile and positions within the firm 
are easily segregated by group characteristic, then any wage disparity between majority 
and minority workers of equal productivity will vanish as firms compete for the cheaper 
supply.  When the stringent assumptions of the polar case are not met, however, the 
Becker model of customer discrimination can explain enduring wage shortfalls for the 
dispreferred group. 
 
1.  Borjas and Bronars’ Customer Discrimination Model 
In contrast, the Borjas and Bronars (1989) model of self-employment and 
customer discrimination introduces imperfect information and search costs, which 
generate not only workforce segregation but also income inequality.  The model assumes 
that individuals can be divided on two dimensions: (1) between white (w) and black (b), 
and (2) between buyers and sellers of each race.  The percentage of black sellers in the 
population is given by γ, while that of white sellers is 1 – γ.  Assume also that these 
fractions hold for the buyer population.  The mechanism through which discrimination 
                                                 
30 Mulligan and Rubinstein (2005) conclude that the primary factors leading to the narrowing of the 
measured gender wage gap are that women are investing more in their market productivity and there is a 
positive selection effect operating in that, unlike in the 1970’s, “women working in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
typically had better backgrounds (in terms of own schooling, cognitive test scores, and parental schooling) 
than did non-working women.” 
31 Nardinelli and Simon (1990) discover that baseball trading cards featuring nonwhite players sell at a 
discount compares to white athletes and List (2004) uses an experimental design to uncover discriminatory 
bargaining offers between white and nonwhite card traders.  Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1998) find that the 
racial composition of a firm’s clientele affects hiring decisions with respect to race (especially for positions 
with customer contact) as well as the wages that workers receive.   17
operates is the price markup that the representative white buyer perceives to pay for the 
product of a black seller, denoted by δ.
32  Therefore, the maximum price that a white 
buyer will pay for a good produced by a black seller is R(1 – δ), where R is the 
consumer’s valuation of the product.   
  The value of a price offer from a seller of race i to a buyer of race j, V(P, i,  j), can 
take one of three values.  In the event that a transaction occurs, the price paid may equal 
the buyer’s reservation price (which yields a net payoff of zero) or there may be some 
positive net gain R – D(i,  j)P, where P is the seller’s price offer.  If the buyer rejects a 
proposal, then she incurs cost C and has expected valuation EV(P, i,  j) in the next round 
of search. 
  Sellers, on the other hand, seek to maximize the utility function U = I – (H
λ / λ), 
where I is income, H represents hours worked and λ > 1.  They produce goods at the rate 
β, conduct α transactions per unit of time and a fraction τ of those transactions result in 
sales.  The variable τ is determined by the segregation strategy of the seller, which equals 
one for sales to all consumers or γ and 1 – γ, respectively, for exclusive sales to blacks or 
whites.  If production and sales cannot be performed simultaneously, then the efficient 
portion of the workday devoted to production is s = ατ / (ατ + β).
33  Substituting these 
values into the function U and maximizing over H yields an optimal number of hours 
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where σ = λ / (λ – 1) and y represents income consistent with utility maximizing behavior.  
The segregation strategy is then chosen to maximize indirect utility according to equation 
(12).  Finally, the model allows for differences in seller productivity with high-ability (h) 
and low-ability (l) individuals in each race group.   
  Borjas and Bronars close the model by characterizing the equilibrium 
distributions of prices and income for the various types of market actors.  Based on their 
assumptions about preferences and production technologies, the equilibrium set of prices 
is described by the following observations: 
 
1)  The price that sellers charge is the minimum of the reservation prices of the 
consumers they opt to serve. 
2)  The order of reservation prices is: P*(w, w) ≥ P*(w, b) = P*(b, b) ≥ P*(b, w). 
3)  If the market segregates by race, then sellers will be of the same race as buyers. 
4)  Since high-ability sellers segregate only if their low-ability counterparts do, then 
the offer price distribution is ordered as: Pwl ≥ Pwh ≥ Pbl ≥ Pbh. 
 
                                                 
32 It is assumed that white consumers do not discriminate against white sellers and that black buyers are 
indifferent between sellers of either race. 
33 Efficiency dictates that the part of the work day spent in production, sβH, equals the portion spent 
conducting transactions, ατ(1 - s)H.  Solving for s gives the equation in the text.   18
Thus, the price schedule of white sellers constitutes a ceiling above which black sellers 
will never charge.  Perhaps more striking is the result that high-ability sellers of both 
races never price above their low-ability equivalents. 
  These results determine the first two moments of the income distributions for 
white and black sellers.  From the fourth condition above for prices, it is clear that even if 
both black and white sellers are retaining all contacts (τ = 1), the latter can always charge 
a higher price and, on average, generate more revenue.  Therefore, the mean of the white 
income distribution will be greater than that of the black sellers.  As for the variance of 
the distributions, Borjas and Bronars note that higher returns to ability follow from 
greater variance in the distribution of income.
34  They define the variable ∆ to be the ratio 
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Whenever ∆ > 1, the returns to ability for whites exceed those for blacks, and Borjas and 
Bronars derive a set of outcomes for the variance based on different market segregation 
patterns.   
These features of the price and income distributions indicate that incomplete 
information (and attendant search costs) for consumers coupled with discriminatory tastes 
will not only affect the size of the minority class in the market but also its quality 
composition.  Since high ability members of the minority class face lower returns to their 
skill, they also have fewer incentives to engage in the prejudiced market.  
  
2.  Chiswick’s Employee Discrimination Model 
In addition to customer discrimination, Becker identified fellow employees’ tastes 
as an alternative source of biased outcomes.  Chiswick (1973) developed a model of 
employee discrimination (which was then used to conduct an empirical analysis) as 
follows.  Consider the case in which white workers in some location prefer not to work 









i Y is the wage of a white worker who works only with other whites, Xi equals one 
if he works with nonwhites and zero otherwise, and δi is the discrimination coefficient, 
which may vary with i.  Furthermore, let µx be the mean of the Xi’s, or the proportion of 
white workers in integrated firms, p represent the share of nonwhites in the population, µδ 
the mean of the δi’s and k = µ / p an index of integration.   
  As in the customer discrimination model, Chiswick’s analysis focuses on the 
degree of income inequality.  Taking first the natural log and then the variance of 
equation (14) yields the following two equations (for small δi): 
                                                 
34 Borjas and Bronars specifically examine the variance of log income, a standard measure of income 
inequality, given in this model by π(1 – π)[ln(yih/yil)]
2.  Since this variance measure increases with the ratio 
of high-ability to low-ability incomes, greater variance is suggestive of a higher return to ability.     19
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After invoking the formula for the variance of the product of random variables and 
applying some additional algebra, Chiswick presents the final version of the model as: 
 
( ) { } U p k p k Y Y + − + + + =
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where U is the residual capturing the unmeasurable covariance term in equation (16). 
  Inspection of equation (17) generates several hypotheses governing the 
relationship between income inequality and the level of integration in the workforce.  For 
a fixed variance of Y
*, white wage disparity increases with the nonwhite population (p).
35  
Holding constant the discriminatory preferences of white workers, the more labor market 
integration, the greater the inequity of white earnings.  Finally, inequality increases with 
the prevalence of discriminatory tastes (holding integration constant) and with the 
variance in those tastes (holding integration and mean tastes fixed).  In fact, Chiswick’s 
empirical analysis suggests that white employee discrimination against nonwhites raises 
average white income inequality by 2.3 percent in the entire U.S. and 3.1 percent in the 
South.
36  However, discrimination against whites by nonwhites was not found to be a 
significant factor in explaining their income inequality. 
 
3.  Did Ideology Influence the Acceptance of the Employer Animus Model? 
Given the relative value of the various models in explaining persistent labor 
market discrimination, it is important to consider why the employer-animus model 
(henceforth “the employer model”) became the dominant economic model of 
discrimination from the time Becker advanced it in 1959 and Milton Friedman 
championed it in the early 1960s.  One possible answer is that ideology often trumps truth 
when high political stakes are involved, and both the left and right had reasons for 
preferring the employer model.  The left found it more palatable to blame employers 
instead of customers and fellow workers for the ravages of discrimination, and with the 
enormous political battle brewing over adoption of a federal antidiscrimination law, it 
was better strategy to say that the law was needed to deal with bad southern employers 
than with the bad citizens of the South (the rest of the country had already adopted state 
antidiscrimination laws, so the heart of the debate was whether Congress should impose 
an antidiscrimination law on the South).  At the same time, the right embraced the Becker 
employer-animus model out of dislike for antidiscrimination law and the desire to follow 
the lead blocking of Milton Friedman (a major opponent of the state antidiscrimination 
laws) in arguing that legal intervention was unnecessary since the market would 
effectively discipline discriminatory employers.  Writing in 1963 and hoping to derail the 
federal efforts to adopt an antidiscrimination law, Milton Friedman clearly did not want 
to draw attention to the fact that the market rewards and hence encourages obeisance to 
the discriminatory preferences of fellow employees and customers: rather than driving 
                                                 
35 For this result to hold, Chiswick observes that µx must be less than ½.  
36 Chiswick (1973).   20
out these discriminators, the market will serve to entrench those who cater to the 
discriminatory tastes of fellow workers and customers. 
Friedman engendered much antagonism for the discipline of economics by his 
strident opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  While his equation of this federal law to 
the Nazi Nuremberg laws (see the quote below in the text at footnote 66) was puzzling, 
and his claim in the early 1960s that blacks would be better off without the law has now 
been widely rejected, Friedman’s opposition to an antidiscrimination law that injected 
government into a large realm of hitherto unregulated private contracting is consistent 
with his larger goal of promoting freer markets and less government.  It is not implausible 
that he believed that in the long-run even southern blacks would be better off with this 
policy mixture.  One sees this sentiment expressed in the work of Bhagwati (discussed 
above), in which he invokes the Becker employer model in stressing the benefits of 
competition and free trade in reducing earnings disparities by sex.  The bottom line then 
is that market incentives can encourage discrimination in some settings and discourage it 
in others, and therefore, one needs to know a considerable amount about the nature of the 
discrimination and the institutional context before one can predict which of these 
outcomes will occur.  In the Jim Crow South, federal law was needed to protect blacks 
since both the market and the local judicial/political system had failed, but that doesn’t 
necessarily imply that federal antidiscrimination law is serving a similarly important 
function today.  Nor can one conclude that because the market catered to the 
discriminatory preferences of workers and customers at an earlier time, increased market 
pressures today from free trade and globalization will cause more discrimination 
(although these economic forces might harm workers at the bottom end of the socio-
economic scale, who are disproportionately black, not because of discrimination but 
because of the downward pressure on the wages of low-skill workers).   
In certain settings, customers have demonstrated strong discriminatory 
preferences.  In the early days of Title VII, the courts addressed the issue of whether an 
employer could lawfully accommodate the discriminatory preferences of customers in a 
series of cases challenging airline rules that favored the hiring of young, unmarried, and 
attractive women to be flight attendants.  The law is now well-established that such 
conduct constitutes unlawful employment discrimination.  Clearly, the market and the 
law have clashed in this arena.
37 
Fellow-worker discrimination is also a problem, but it need not undermine 
employment prospects (in terms of jobs and wages) if firms simply move to more 
segregated workforces.  Of course, because current law prohibits segregation, the market 
and the law are in direct conflict in this area as well.  But while customer and fellow-
worker discrimination can explain the enduring character of racial discrimination in the 
South (in contrast to the employer model), neither customer nor fellow-worker 
discrimination can explain the pattern of exclusion from the southern textile industry.  
Customers would have no way of knowing, nor presumably would they care about, the 
race of the workers in textile plants.  Although fellow-worker discrimination might 
                                                 
37 Indeed, the airline run by the restaurant chain Hooters has found a way around the prohibitions of Title 
VII by structuring its service of Hooters Girls on its planes as a way of selling sex appeal (since federal law 
allows sex discrimination if it is based on a bona fide occupational qualification) rather than hiring these 
women for customary flight attendant jobs, for which the airline would have no right to discriminate on the 
basis of sex.   21
explain exclusion from a particular plant, if this problem were rampant, it would, again, 
only lead to segregated plants -- not the complete exclusion of blacks from the industry 




C.  The Cartel Model of Discrimination 
  The second rival to employer animus models is the cartel model of discrimination, 
which was designed to explain the enduring discriminatory patterns of the Jim Crow 
South.  While Becker premised his models of discrimination on the operation of a 
perfectly competitive market operating without constraint, the cartel model posits that 
white employers and workers managed to thwart the operation of the market by 
exploitatively relegating blacks to low-paying positions.
39  While Becker argued that 
discriminators were hurt by their discriminatory attitudes, the cartel model posits that 
discrimination generates supra-competitive profits for the discriminators.
40  The cartel 
model has a clear advantage over the Becker employer-discrimination model by better 
conforming with the reality that “the market” never seemed to thwart Jim Crow 
restrictions, which endured for decades until federal intervention finally brought them 
crashing down.  Similarly, the cartel model conforms to the historical evidence better 
than the customer and fellow-worker discrimination models.  Specifically, the customer 
discrimination model founders because discrimination was present even when customers 
could not identify workers, and the fellow-worker discrimination model predicts 
segregation (not wholesale exclusion as was observed in the southern textile industry).  
Libertarians, such as Richard Epstein, have also endorsed the cartel model since it has an 
appealing built-in remedy -- simply destroy the power of the cartel, and the market will 
be able to operate in the protective manner that it should.  Government might be needed 
to break up the cartel, but once competition is restored, government should revert to its 
more limited role of preventing the use of force and fraud.
41  In short, the libertarian 
argument is that no antidiscrimination law is needed once the stranglehold of the racist 
cartel is broken.   
  What is still unclear, though, is whether the “cartel” was the product of pernicious 
governmental restrictions and private violence, as Epstein insists, or the product of status-
enhancing norms that generated utility gains for the white community, as Richard 
McAdams has argued.
42  While both Epstein and McAdams agree that whites clearly 
collaborated to help themselves at the expense of blacks, and while some of this action 
                                                 
38 One Chicago scholar responded to hearing of the findings of Heckman and Payner (1989) by pointing out 
that a powerful industry-wide union could have explained the exclusion of blacks.  While the point is 
correct as a matter of theory, it fails as a matter of fact – such powerful unions were largely absent in the 
southern textile industry throughout the first sixty-five years of the 20
th Century. 
39 See Altonji and Blank (1999) for an excellent review of the theoretical literature on occupational 
exclusion. 
40 Recall from the discussion of the Becker employer model depicted in Figure 1 that the monetary profits 
of the discriminators rose even though their utility fell because of the psychic cost of having non-preferred 
workers.  In the cartel model, the employers are able to restrict the hiring of black labor exactly as depicted 
in Figure 1, but in the cartel model they do so in order to increase their monetary profits without paying the 
psychic cost.  The absence of competition enables the discriminatory employers to maintain the supra-
competitive price. 
41 Epstein (1992). 
42 McAdams (1995).   22
was enforced by law -- for example, many aspects of segregation were legally mandated -
- there were many arenas in the South in which the law did not speak, yet the cartel was 
maintained.  For example, there was no legal requirement that firms refuse to hire blacks, 
yet entire industries in the South did this for decades without any sign that the market was 
eroding this pattern -- until the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  McAdams and 
Epstein then stand in contrast to Becker and Friedman in arguing that federal 
governmental action was necessary to break up the power of the white cartel.  But 
McAdams rejects the Epsteinian view that the cartel could only have been sustained by 
virtue of discriminatory governmental action, which itself was the problem.  According to 
McAdams, legal intervention was needed to overcome discriminatory patterns that were 
not backed up by governmental restrictions.  Whites had a vested interest in policing the 
informal cartel because they benefited from the increase in prestige and status, as well as 
the monetary benefits that were derived from subordinating blacks.  McAdams marshals 
the social science literature showing that groups can enforce norms which enable a cartel 
to persist and thwart the power of those whose efforts to cheat on the cartel -- for 
example, firms hiring cheap black labor -- might eliminate the discriminatory conduct. 
  Interestingly, even if McAdams’ hypothesis provides a better theoretical 
explanation for discrimination during the Jim Crow era than that offered by Becker or 
Friedman, there remains a question about its relevance to current American conditions.  
Are self-enforcing discriminatory norms still powerful enough to undermine the 
protective forces of competitive labor markets?  Current stories of American companies 
establishing customer service call centers in foreign countries suggest a type of 
aggressive pursuit of profits that is hard to square with any pure taste for discrimination 
or self-enforcing discriminatory norms.
43 
 
D. Statistical  Discrimination 
  The models of statistical discrimination are the third set of rivals to the employer 
animus models.  A central feature in these models is that unobservable attributes of 
workers that differ by sex, race or ethnicity prevent employers from ascertaining their 
true individual capabilities.  Consequently, the existence of imperfect information 
induces employers to form hiring and wage decisions based on whatever observable 
information they can gather (including the worker’s race or sex) as well as their prior 
beliefs about the expected ability of potential workers.  This concept was first introduced 
by the models of Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973).  Since then, extensions of these 
theories have been highly prominent in the economic analysis of discrimination.  Section 
1 begins with a discussion of “statistical discrimination” in which the underlying 
                                                 
43 Query whether these global shifts only suggest that enormous profit opportunities can overcome 
discrimination.  According to “Financial Firms Hasten Their Move to Outsourcing” (2004):  
in 2003 the average M.B.A. working in the financial services industry in India, where the cost of 
living is about 30 percent less than in the United States, earned 14 percent of his American 
counterpart's wages. Information technology professionals earned 13 percent, while call center 
workers who provide customer support and telemarketing services earned 7 percent of their 
American counterparts' salaries.   Experts say that with China, India, the former Soviet Union and 
other nations embracing free trade and capitalism, there is a population 10 times that of the United 
States with average wage advantages of 85 percent to 95 percent. 
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productivities of the two groups are unequal, perhaps because of poorer schooling and 
lower SES (blacks) or because of expected differences in tenure (women).  Section 2 then 
discusses two models of statistical discrimination in which the underlying productivities 
of the two groups are equal yet because of the imperfection of the signal available to the 
employer which is more variable for the dispreferred group, earnings disparities emerge 
between equally productive groups of workers.  The two models are the standard, static 
model of statistical discrimination as depicted in Aigner and Cain (1977) and the 
dynamic extension in Oettinger (1996), which allows for learning over time.  
 
  1. “Statistical  Discrimination”  Where Group Productivities are Unequal 
Statistical discrimination models would appear to have greater explanatory power 
than the Becker employer model in that they are consistent with the persistence of 
discrimination over long periods of time.  Note, though, that while statistical 
discrimination as here defined is clearly prohibited under federal law, it does not 
necessarily constitute discrimination in the economist’s sense of the term.  Specifically, if 
on average Group A is less productive than Group B (perhaps because of poorer 
schooling options), then it is not discriminatory (in the economist’s definition) for 
members of Group A to be paid less than those of Group B.  Indeed, to the economist, a 
situation in which the earnings shortfall accurately reflects the productivity shortfall is the 
definition of a non-discriminatory outcome.  Federal law is clear, however, that ascribing 
the qualities of a racial or gender group to an individual member of that group (even if 
correct on average) constitutes unlawful discrimination against that individual.  The 
greater individualized treatment in the hiring process that the law mandates will tend to 
help the more elite members of the group, who will not be tainted with the lower-average 
quality predictions that would otherwise be ascribed to them.
44  Conversely, eliminating 
statistical discrimination tends to harm those with the least human capital, as more 
individualized consideration will confirm their likely lower-than-average productivity.  
Thus, unless reliance on statistical discrimination impairs human capital accumulation or 
on the job performance -- a subject addressed below -- the legal attack on statistical 
discrimination should not be expected to improve overall welfare of any disfavored group 
but only to redistribute wealth from the poorest members of that group to its more 
affluent members. 
  Three main points should be made about this simple model of statistical 
discrimination.  First, while the practice will be persistent to the extent that it is profitable 
to employers (presumably in helping them select good workers at low cost), there are 
ways for the above-average members of the group to protect themselves by signaling 
their high productivity to employers.  Of course, without the benefit of Title VII, these 
workers would have to pay the costs of such signaling, which may be an argument for the 
                                                 
44 The divergence between the economist’s conception of discrimination and the legal or popular 
conception of discrimination is illustrated by the manner in which the law tries to encourage employers not 
to consider the fact that young women are highly likely at some point to have children, which may impose 
costs on the employer.  Indeed, if the only salient difference between male and female workers was that 
women needed to take time off for childbirth and subsequently spent more time in child-rearing than their 
male counterparts, and these traits were costly or less desirable to employers, than an economist would say 
that paying women identically for what is on average a less valuable contribution to an employer would be 
discrimination.  Any attempt to pay women less on these grounds would clearly violate both the legal and 
popular conception of discrimination.   24
legal prohibition if these signaling costs are high relative to the costs of legal 
enforcement.   Second, there is a potential inefficiency associated with statistical 
discrimination in that it undermines ex ante incentives for investment in human capital if 
workers perceive that they will be treated ex post as “average” members of their group 
when seeking employment.
45  Unless a signal can overcome this treatment – note the 
distinction between a directly productive investment in human capital and a pure signal 
that is merely revelatory but unproductive -- a worker who invests in greater human 
capital incurs a cost that is not fully rewarded, which will therefore result in inefficient 
underinvestment.  Again, this inefficiency can provide a second basis for the legal 
prohibition of statistical discrimination.  But while the risk of underinvestment in human 
capital as a response to statistical discrimination may have been more problematic in the 
past, the current empirical evidence raises doubt that this is a major concern today since 
returns to education are as high for blacks and other groups as they are for whites.
46  
Whether underinvestment induced by statistical discrimination has been a major problem 
for other protected workers, such as women or the disabled, is unclear.   
The third point may be the most telling criticism of statistical discrimination when 
practiced against previously subordinated groups.  In this situation, it may be unrealistic 
to assume that employer judgments will be correct on average since cognitive biases may 
tend to confirm the negative stereotypes that are retained from the time of subordination.  
Indeed, numerous studies find that individuals focus more on confirming evidence while 
tending to discount disconfirming evidence, which suggests that a legacy of past 
subordination may tend to be self-perpetuating if stereotypes tend to be reinforced.
47  Of 
course, competitive markets will tend to discipline firms that are subject to such cognitive 
biases and reward those who more accurately set the price of labor.  But as Bhagwati 
suggested in his discussion of the gains from introducing external competition, a social 
consensus can develop about the attributes of previously subordinated groups that is 
highly resistant to change.  Psychologists have developed an implicit attitudes test that 
reveals that most Americans strongly associate -- albeit at an unconscious level -- 
positive attributes with being white and negative attributes with being black.
48 As 
Kenneth Arrow has observed: 
 
 “Suppose Blacks and Whites do in fact differ in productivity, at least on the 
average.  This is in turn due to some cause, perhaps quality of education, 
perhaps cultural differences; but the cause is not itself observable.  Then the 
experience of employers over time will cause them to use the observable 
characteristic, race, as a surrogate for the unobservable characteristics which in 
fact cause the productivity differences.”
49 
 
                                                 
45 Lundberg and Startz (1998). 
46 One might still argue that, perhaps owing to lower parental investment and lower quality education, the 
costs of greater personal investment in human capital are higher for blacks, which might suggest that blacks 
would need more than equal percentage returns to elicit the optimal level of human capital investment.    
47 Loury (2002).  It appears that certain beliefs are important to many as a basis of providing a sense of 
order or security, and these beliefs can be highly resistant to change even in the face of compelling 
evidence to the contrary. 
48 Greenwald, Banaji, et al (2002). 
49 Arrow (1998).   25
At some point, the repeated association of race and lower productivity may become an 
embedded truth for many, as well as a factor that systematically undermines the 
productivity and performance of the victims of this stereotype, through what 
psychologists have called the “stereotype threat.”
50   Indeed, once this “self-confirming” 
stereotype becomes entrenched, it might well lead to the type of Beckerian animus-based 
discrimination that was discussed above.
51  The growing literature that supports this view 
strengthens the case for legal prohibition of such discrimination.
52 
Arrow also believes that none of the economic models of discrimination can fully 
explain the observable patterns of behavior.  For example, he finds that there is no 
market-based explanation for discrimination against black consumers, yet he considers 
the evidence in support of such discrimination to be compelling. Arrow also conjectures 
that beliefs and individual preferences may themselves be the product of social 
interactions unmediated by prices and markets.  He focuses on the non-market network of 
social acquaintances and friends in the labor market that are often stratified by sex and 
race.  Arrow emphasizes that this “network model” may be the most appropriate for the 
labor market, because each transaction within the employment sphere is a social event.
53  
Since employment may occur by means of referral from current employees, labor 
segregation and discrimination can easily arise, particularly if profit maximization takes a 
subordinate role to maintaining a social network.   
 
 2 .  True Discrimination – Equally Productive Groups yet Unequal Pay 
  If employers simply generalize about individuals based on group difference in 
average productivity, we have seen that true discrimination is difficult to generate. Seeing 
every women as the average woman does hurt some women, but helps others (those 
below the average for women) and hence can not really explain group differences in 
average pay that are not based on group differences in average productivity.  To explain 
this kind of discriminatory outcome, we need to focus on differences in the reliability of 
productivity-related information across groups.  This approach is taken by Aigner and 
Cain (1977), whose model develops as follows.  Consider again a labor market comprised 
of two groups, X and Y, and let their underlying productive ability, α, be a random 
variable distributed such that )   , ( Ν   ∼  
2
α σ µ α .  Aigner and Cain assume that the employer 
does not know the value of α for a job applicant but possesses information about the 
distribution of ability in the overall population.  Although the employer ex ante cannot 
learn α, he observes a noisy signal s (such as the score from an aptitude test) which 
equals the sum of true ability and a normally distributed error term with mean zero and 
variance
2
g σ for g = X, Y.  The crucial assumption of the model is that
22
XY σ σ > , which 
means that the signal more accurately reflects latent ability for Group Y.  Presuming that 
                                                 
50 Steele and Aronson (1995). 
51 Loury (2002) and Ramirez (2004). 
52 Arrow finds the model of statistical discrimination can also explain discrimination in the mortgage 
market because blacks default more on loans than whites.  Discrimination in this market is statistical rather 
than taste-based because the mortgage-lender is simply attempting to minimize risk when providing more 
loans to whites. 
53 See Bayer, Ross and Topa (2005) for empirical evidence revealing a significant effect of social networks 
on a variety of labor market outcomes.   26
workers and firms are risk neutral, competition for workers bids wages up to their 
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In words, the wage is a weighted average of mean ability (group characteristic) and the 
signal (individual characteristic) where the weights are derived from the projection of α 
onto s.  Differences in the information content of s alter the two weights but do not 
generate differences in the average wage of the two groups.
54 
  The Oettinger (1996) model explores the simplest form of learning using a two-
period horizon.  Let those periods be indexed by t = 1, 2 and allow α and s to vary with 
time.  As before,  ( )
2
α σ µ α   , Ν   ∼   t and  t t t s ε α + = where  ( )
2 , 0 ~ g t N σ ε  and the variance of 
the error term for Group X exceeds that for Group Y.  With only two periods, workers 
may either remain in their period 1 job during period 2 or switch to another position.  
Oettinger continues to assume a wage structure based on expected productivity but also 
allows for piece rate wages; therefore the wage in period t is  t t t w α θ α θ ) 1 ( ˆ − + = where 
t α ˆ is the conditional expectation of ability and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.  This setup departs from the 
static model of statistical discrimination most notably in its assertion that productivity is 
match-specific.  In other words, neither employee nor employer knows the former’s 
ability in a given position before a match takes place.  Thus, Oettinger remarks that for 
this model of learning to matter, “the arrival of this new information…must vary across 
job matches, and job mobility must be feasible.”
55      
  Since the firm will discover α1 for a worker that stays in period 2, the wage 
schedule over time will be: 
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Recall from above that the conditional expectation of α1 under risk neutrality does not 
differ between Group X and Group Y; it is simply µ.  Since period 1 wages are a 
weighted average of that conditional expectation and its true value, initial wages for X 
and Y are then expected to be equal. 
                                                 
54 Taking the expectation of wages over s, it is evident that the average wage will be the mean level of 
ability µ since that is the mean of s.  For this reason, Aigner and Cain take issue with the original Phelps 
(1972) model because differences in mean ability or signal variances do not engender average wage 
inequality.  Thus, in order to get true discrimination, they demonstrate that employers must also be risk 
averse. This means that employer utility depends on signal variances, which causes the group with the less 
informative signal to receive a lower average wage.  The model is subject to criticism, not only on the 
grounds that the signals are not less reliable for different groups, but also because it would seem to be 
unlikely that employers are sufficiently risk averse to penalize blacks to a large degree. 
55 Oettinger (1996).   27
  The model then analyzes expectations of between-period wage changes and 
second period wages to derive hypotheses about the effects of signal extraction on wage 
disparities.  Workers will choose to remain in their period 1 jobs if they expect a wage 
decrease from moving.  Hence their expectation, conditional on staying, is: 
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where ρ is the signal to noise ratio.  The implication of equation (20) is that the expected 
value of staying decreases as the signal becomes more precise.  Therefore, under the 
model’s assumptions, X stayers can expect larger average wage gains than Y stayers.  On 
the other hand, a mover faces an expected wage of: 
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Now, enhanced signal precision (higher ρ) raises expected wages and thus predicts 
greater wage gains for Y movers.   
  In the second period, only the level of w2 matters since the decision to move or 
stay has already been made.  The expectations of a worker that remains at his first period 
firm and one that relocates are, respectively: 
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These two equations differ solely by the factor ρ
2 in the second term on the right hand 
side.  Since that coefficient is necessarily positive but less than one, the model suggests 
positive returns to job tenure.  However, as ρ rises, so too does the return to job 
switching.  Therefore, Group X should benefit more from staying in period 2, whereas 
Group Y profits from changing positions.  Using equations (22) and (23), one can 
compute the unconditional second period wage to be: 
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This equation unambiguously predicts that Group Y, with a higher value of ρ, will have 
higher wages in the second period.  Thus, “the model predicts that while no wage gap 
should exist at the time of labor force entry, one should develop as time in the labor force 
accumulates.”  Oettinger’s intuition for this outcome is that the random draw that   28
characterizes period 1 matching precludes any wage gap.  However, more successful 
matches in the future lead to higher wages, and minorities (in our case, Group X) are 
disadvantaged because of their noisy productivity signal.
56   
  The theoretical models discussed in this section are interesting in that they purport 
to explain how groups of equal productivity receive unequal compensation without resort 
to animus or bias.  Nonetheless, Cain (1986: 729) does “not find the empirical 
counterparts to [these] models of statistical discrimination and signaling to be 
convincing.”  Altonji and Blank (1999: 3190) concur: “we are unaware of any empirical 
work that systematically investigates the proposition that the ‘signal to noise’ in employer 
assessment of workers is lower for women than men or for blacks than whites, despite the 
prominence of the idea in the discrimination literature.  For this reason, we are not clear 
how much weight should be placed on the statistical discrimination/information quality 
explanations for differences in group outcomes…” 
 
IV. SHOULD PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION BE PROHIBITED? 
 
Although the American public overwhelmingly endorses the view that labor 
market discrimination on the basis of race and gender should be unlawful, standard 
economic theory can be invoked to argue that such discrimination should not be 
prohibited.  This argument proceeds from a basic assumption of neoclassical economics 
that utility maximization is an attractive principle of social welfare.  As a first 
approximation, permitting individuals to make choices that may reflect discriminatory 
preferences maximizes utility.  In essence, a partial equilibrium analysis invests the 
intersection of supply and demand curves with normative significance, and neoclassical 
economics tends to view discrimination as simply one more preference that shapes those 
curves. 
Put differently, standard neoclassical economics usually begins with the 
assumption that, in the absence of market failure, there is no economic argument for 
government intervention into a competitive labor market.  In the various taste-based 
models, discrimination merely reflects a personal preference of an employer, fellow 
employee, or customer not to associate with a certain category of individuals.
57  This 
model of personal preference implies that discrimination does not constitute a “market 
failure” in that competitive markets will still generate the most efficient allocation of 
resources.  In terms of the partial equilibrium analysis of a labor market depicted in 
Figure 1, discrimination is a factor that influences the contours of the relevant supply and 
demand curves, but the intersection of those curves still represents the efficient solution 
in that any deviation from that outcome would lower welfare (as long as one honors 
discriminatory preferences).  Similarly, under the statistical discrimination models, firms 
are assumed to be profit-maximizing, so again there is no market failure, which ordinarily 
implies that there is no efficiency argument for governmental intervention.
58 
                                                 
56 One should keep in mind that these results are predicated on the assumption that θ does not vary between 
the two groups.  If it did, the results would be ambiguous. 
57 Becker (1957). 
58 For an argument that antidiscrimination law can promote efficiency in a world of Becker employer 
discrimination by driving the discriminators from the market more rapidly, and thereby reducing the costs 
of discrimination, see Donohue (1986), the reply in Posner (1987) and a final rejoinder in Donohue (1987).   29
In a competitive market, the price of a good or service should equal its value to 
the marginal buyer (if not, competitive pressures will cause the price to rise or fall to 
restore the equality.) Thus, from the perspective of consumer sovereignty, a free market 
economist might even say that, in a competitive market, there can be no “discrimination” 
in the sense that the price paid for any good or service should equal the value that the 
marginal purchaser places on it.  Figure 1 reveals that the marginal purchaser of black 
labor values the marginal worker by BQ2, which is clearly lower than AQ1, the value of 
the marginal worker in the absence of discrimination.  This is somewhat of a semantic 
point, but one would ordinarily not say that a customer who prefers the voice of Singer A 
to that of Singer B and thus is willing to pay more for recordings of A’s music is 
“discriminating” against Singer B.  The willingness to spend more to enjoy A’s music 
reflects the customer’s preference for that artist, and the market will ordinarily cater to 
that preference.  In essence, the modern legal prohibition of “discrimination” posits that 
any preference based on race, gender, and a host of other factors is illegitimate and 
therefore, the goal of law is to ascertain the equilibrium intersection of the supply and 
demand curves -- point A in Figure 1 -- that would exist if no economic agent had any 
awareness of these traits (or at least no differential valuation of them).  Of course, the 
pure preference distinction between Singer A and Singer B does not capture the historical 
context in which blacks have endured a long history of oppression and subordination.  
This example does raise the issue of whether discrimination in the absence of such 
history of oppression should be treated differently from other market preferences.  Would 
white males over 40 – the primary litigants in age discrimination cases – have a strong 
claim for legal protection on these grounds? 
The moral judgment that discriminatory preferences should not enter the social 
welfare calculus might be analogized to the standard philosophical argument that 
malicious preferences -- those benefits that derive from the suffering of others -- must be 
outside the welfare calculus.  Clearly, some discrimination has been of this type in that it 
has been used to subordinate certain groups as a means to elevating the well-being of 
members of the dominant group.
59  But not all discrimination has this malicious, other-
regarding character, and philosophers have had trouble justifying why non-malicious 
discriminatory preferences should be disregarded.  Consider in this regard the words of 
Ronald Dworkin arguing against Catherine MacKinnon’s view that pornography should 
be prohibited because it represents impermissible discrimination against women.
60  
Dworkin argues that the “principle that considerations of equality require that some 
people not be free to express their tastes or preferences anywhere” is “frightening” and 
that if liberty and equality really conflict “we should have to choose liberty because the 
alternative would be the despotism of the thought-police.”
61 
  But in the realm of discrimination in employment, housing, and education, we do 
have to choose between liberty and equality (at least in the negative conception of liberty 
implying freedom from external restraint).  As Dworkin states: 
 
Exactly because the moral environment in which we all live is in good part 
created by others … the question of who shall have the power to help 
                                                 
59 See the discussion of McAdams (1995) in Section III (C), above. 
60 Dworkin (1993). 
61 Dworkin (1993).   30
shape that environment, and how, is of fundamental importance, though it 
is often neglected in political theory.  Only one answer is consistent with 
the ideals of political equality:  that no one may be prevented from 
influencing the shared moral environment, through his own private 
choices, tastes, opinions, and example, just because these tastes or 
opinions disgust those who have the power to shut him up or lock him up.  
Of course, the ways in which anyone may exercise that influence must be 
limited in order to protect the security and interests of others.  People may 
not try to mold the moral climate by intimidating women with sexual 
demands or by burning a cross on a black family’s lawn, or by refusing to 
hire women or blacks at all, or by making their working conditions so 
humiliating as to be intolerable (emphasis supplied). 
 
But we cannot count, among the kinds of interests that may be protected in 
this way, a right not to be insulted or damaged just by the fact that others 
have hostile or uncongenial tastes, or that they are free to express or 
indulge them in private.  Recognizing that right would mean denying that 
some people -- whose tastes these are -- have any right to participate in 
forming the moral environment at all. 
 
…This is an old liberal warning -- as old as Voltaire -- and many people 
have grown impatient with it. They are willing to take the chance, they 
say, to advance a program that seems overwhelmingly important now.  
Their impatience may prove fatal for that program rather than essential to 
it, however.  If we abandon our traditional understanding of equality for a 
different one that allows a majority to define some people as too corrupt or 
offensive or radical to join in the informal moral life of the nation, we will 
have begun a process that ends, as it has in so many other parts of the 
world, in making equality something to be feared rather than celebrated, a 
mocking, ‘correct’ euphemism for tyranny.
62  (Emphasis supplied.) 
 
  There is an interesting contradiction here.  At first, Dworkin seems to be making a 
strong philosophical argument for why individuals should be allowed to exercise their 
private tastes and choices by discriminating against other groups even if society finds that 
offensive (note specifically the language in italics).  But then, in the language highlighted 
in bold, he specifically exempts employment discrimination from his general view that 
liberty interests must trump equality.  Note that in detailing the types of conduct that 
society can legitimately curtail, Dworkin includes acts of intimidation and coercion -- 
which were traditionally prohibited as common law torts -- as well as simple refusals to 
deal with certain groups, which have traditionally been permitted.  Richard Epstein notes 
that “the parallel between force and discrimination has an apparent verbal seductiveness, 
but the differences between the two types of behavior are so profound that it is unwise to 
move from a condemnation of force to an equal condemnation of discrimination…”
63 
                                                 
62 Dworkin (1993). 
63 Epstein (1992).   31
As Epstein notes, acts of coercion and force undermine security because even if 
99 percent of the populace is not a threat, we must be concerned about the one percent 
that “bears us the most ill will.”  But with competitive labor markets, we need not worry 
about the person who most dislikes us, but can seek out and contract with those who bear 
us the least ill will.  As long as a few employers are willing to hire members of any 
protected class, these workers will have options that are far more attractive than if they 
had to deal with the most discriminatory employer.  Although violence and 
discrimination have often gone together, Epstein argues that, if government had to choose 
which it would focus on stopping first, it should choose violence.
64  Compared to 
discrimination, violence is easier to identify and hence sanction (with lower Type I and 
Type II error), and the benefits of stopping violence will be more far-reaching.  This 
distinction is also important in evaluating the results of audit experiments that seek to 
uncover the proportion of employers who harbor bias against certain groups.  If, for 
example, 20 percent of potential employers would discriminate against a particular group, 
this does not necessarily tell us whether the members of that group will suffer significant 
harm in the labor market -- as long as a considerable portion of the labor market is open 
to them.  Thus, competition dampens the “effective discrimination” experienced by those 
who are victims of bias – at least in terms of wage impairment, even if not in terms of the 
psychological harm of being rejected.
65 
While some economists stress the pragmatic point that competitive markets can 
reduce the need for antidiscrimination law, Milton Friedman, writing in Capitalism and 
Freedom, argues that such laws are not only unnecessary from a consequentialist 
perspective, but also defective as a matter of deontology: 
 
[Antidiscrimination] legislation involves the acceptance of a principle that 
proponents would find abhorrent in almost every other application.  If it is 
appropriate for the state to say that individuals may not discriminate in 
employment because of color or race or religion, then it is equally 
appropriate for the state, provided a majority can be found to vote that 
way, to say that individuals must discriminate in employment on the basis 
of color, race or religion.  The Hitler Nuremberg laws and the law in the 
Southern states imposing special disabilities upon Negroes are both 
examples of laws similar in principle to [antidiscrimination legislation].
66  
 
Note that Friedman’s dubious equation of governmental prohibition and mandates of 
discrimination would be correct if liberty interests always trump equality interests as 
Dworkin argues because curtailing liberty is to be avoided regardless of whether the law 
promotes equality (Title VII) or is designed to stifle it (Nuremberg laws and Jim Crow).  
                                                 
64 Epstein urges that the notion of “rounding up” or enslaving certain groups is completely different from 
merely refusing to deal with the group or choosing only to deal on more favorable turns.  The first is 
imposing harm and the second is simply failing to confer a benefit, which explains why at common law the 
first was unlawful and the second was not. 
65 This applies for both victims of labor market discrimination as well as victims of product market 
discrimination.  Still, the transaction costs of having to seek out the non-discriminators are real (and in one 
respect tend to be exacerbated by an antidiscrimination law since employers can’t advertise only for their 
desired candidates on racial or ethnic grounds). 
66 Friedman (1962).   32
In the latter case, both liberty and equality are infringed, so the argument against the 
Nuremberg laws is particularly strong.  One can easily imagine arguments -- contrary to 
the views of Dworkin and Friedman -- that limited curtailments of liberty could be 
justified by important enhancements of equality (and indeed Dworkin seems to have 
embraced exactly this principle with his endorsement of employment discrimination law).  
Still, one should be mindful of the admonitions of Dworkin, Friedman, Isaiah Berlin and 
others, that governments have inflicted much harm not only when deliberately curtailing 
freedom in order to inflict greater inequality, but also when sacrificing liberty in the name 
of greater equality.
67 
  Ironically, we have the great liberal Dworkin arguing for what seems to be a 
libertarian position vis-à-vis employment discrimination (although he denies this 
conclusion), while the conservative Frank Easterbrook has rather forcefully articulated an 
argument for societal concern about the harm caused by discriminatory attitudes and 
behavior.  In a judicial decision striking down an Indianapolis anti-pornography 
ordinance, Judge Easterbrook offers the following argument for why equality should 
trump liberty in the domain of employment discrimination (although on First Amendment 
grounds he then rejects the force of this argument): 
Indianapolis enacted an ordinance defining “pornography” as a 
practice that discriminates against women. “Pornography” is to be 
redressed through the administrative and judicial methods used 
for other discrimination…Indianapolis justifies the ordinance on 
the ground that pornography affects thoughts. Men who see 
women depicted as subordinate are more likely to treat them so. 
Pornography is an aspect of dominance.  It does not persuade 
people so much as change them. It works by socializing, by 
establishing the expected and the permissible. In this view 
pornography is not an idea; pornography is the injury. 
There is much to this perspective. Beliefs are also facts. People 
often act in accordance with the images and patterns they find 
around them. People raised in a religion tend to accept the tenets 
of that religion, often without independent examination. People 
taught from birth that black people are fit only for slavery rarely 
rebelled against that creed; beliefs coupled with the self-interest 
of the masters established a social structure that inflicted great 
harm while enduring for centuries. Words and images act at the 
level of the subconscious before they persuade at the level of the 
conscious. Even the truth has little chance unless a statement fits 
within the framework of beliefs that may never have been 
subjected to rational study.  
Therefore we accept the premises of this legislation. Depictions 
of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The 
subordinate status of women in turn leads to affront and lower 
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pay at work, insult and injury at home, battery and rape on the 
streets.
68 In the language of the legislature, “[p]ornography is 
central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis of 
discrimination. Pornography is a systematic practice of 
exploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially 
harms women. The bigotry and contempt it produces, with the 
acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for 
equality and rights [of all kinds].” Indianapolis Code Section 16- 
1(a)(2).  American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 
323, C.A.7 (Ind.), 1985, at 323, 328-29. 
  Note that while the specific Indianapolis statute in question was aimed at 
pornography, the statute was deemed to be a form of discrimination against women and 
the arguments advanced in support of the legislation are frequently advanced in support 
of all antidiscrimination law.  If one accepts the view that acts of discrimination serve to 
construct and buttress a powerful and subconscious framework of discriminatory beliefs, 
then the case for governmental intervention is greatly strengthened.  In contrast, if 
discrimination is simply one of the infinite tastes or preferences that individuals express 
through their private choices and labor markets are highly competitive and governed by 
Beckerian notions of discrimination, then it is difficult to construct either an economic or 
philosophic argument for why government intervention would be needed.  The two 
moves that those arguing for employment discrimination law have advanced are that 1) 
the Becker model is incorrect in that it fails adequately to capture the causes and 
consequences of discrimination, and 2) there is some other impediment that keeps the 
labor markets from operating competitively (thereby undermining confidence that 
competition will protect workers from exploitation).  One can translate these two 
arguments into economic terms.  The Becker model is inadequate if discrimination (1) 
creates important negative externalities, (2) is perpetuated by other types of market 
failure, or (3) leads to socially undesirable distributional outcomes, as in the various 
search models described above.  In that event, the Beckerian vision of the competitive 
laissez-faire equilibrium maximizing social welfare is no longer theoretically assured 
even if the discriminatory preferences are fully honored.
69  The second argument posits 
either that discriminators have been able to act as an exploitive and anticompetitive cartel 
in which blacks were essentially denied access to jobs, or there is some other friction that 
prevents the discriminators from being driven from the market at the optimal rate, as 
discussed in Donohue (1986).  Of course, the enduring apparatus of Jim Crow in the 
South prior to the adoption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act would seem to support this 
characterization, as discussed in Section III (C), above. 
  In the end, it is important to realize that both opponents and supporters of bans on 
discrimination have at times relied on rhetorical excess to advance their positions.  Milton 
Friedman’s attempt to equate a law like Title VII to something that is now universally 
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consequences, we mean only that there is evidence to this effect, that this evidence is consistent with much 
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questions….” 
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reviled (the Nazi Nuremberg laws) is one obvious example.  A law that is designed to be 
an integral part of a mandated system of subordination and ultimate extermination simply 
cannot be equated with one that prohibits discrimination.  Similarly, supporters of laws 
such as Title VII link the prohibition of discrimination to a battle against slavery and 
violence against subordinated groups, but again this link need not exist if the only 
practice that is being banned is the individual decision not to deal with a certain group (or 
not to deal in as favorable terms as those given to some other group).  Presumably, acts of 
slavery and violence can (and of course should) be prohibited directly, regardless of 
whether discrimination is tolerated or banned. 
  Nor is every act of discrimination so obviously malicious or mean-spirited.  There 
is considerable evidence that employers pay more for “attractive” workers.
70  According 
to one study: “The 9 percent of working men who are viewed as being below average or 
homely are penalized about 10 percent in hourly earnings.  The 32 percent who are 
viewed as having above-average looks or even as handsome receive an earnings premium 
of 5 percent.”  The study goes on to note that the findings for women are similar although 
somewhat smaller: the best looking women earned 4 percent more, while the least 
attractive earned 5 percent less than average looking workers.
71  Another study found that 
obese women suffer in the labor market, but that 95 percent of their lower economic 
status comes from their poorer prospects in the marriage market (in terms of lower 
probability of marriage and a lower earning spouse if married).
72  Consequently, if race or 
ethnicity influences one’s notion of attractiveness, it would not be surprising if some 
employers gravitated more to certain racial or ethnic groups in making their employment 
decisions.  Employers also may gravitate to certain personalities, which could again be 
influenced by the culture of certain racial or ethnic groups.  While society seems to 
accept preferences for attractive physical or personality traits, the distinction between 
such permissible preferences and impermissible discrimination when the preferences 
correlate with race or ethnicity is not easy to discern either conceptually or in practice.  
Nonetheless, federal antidiscrimination law embodies the judgment that society is willing 
to allow discrimination against “unattractive” individuals as long as the reason for the 
judgment of unattractiveness is not one of the precluded traits of race, sex, religion, 
ethnicity, disability, or age.   
 
                                                 
70 Hamermesh and Parker (2003) examine the effect of physical attractiveness on student evaluations of 
professors. Relying on student evaluations of 94 professors in 463 courses at the University of Texas at 
Austin, they found that teachers’ attractiveness directly impacts the student’s evaluations of their teachers:  
increasing attractiveness by 1 standard deviation increased the evaluation of the professor by roughly one-
half a standard deviation.  The authors consider, but do not resolve, the question of whether the good looks 
correlate with better teaching skills or effectiveness, which might provide a productivity-based explanation 
for the disparity.  But Hamermesh (2005) shows that, in elections for officers of the American Economic 
Association, more attractive pictures in the election brochure increased the votes for the election 
candidates.  Indeed, based on his examination of all 312 candidacies over the period from 1966 – 2004, 
Hamermesh finds that “a particular real-world outcome becomes more favorable for the same person when 
perceptions of his/her looks improve exogenously.”  This finding underscores that perceived attractiveness, 
not some underlying productivity-enhancing characteristic, influences the votes of economists in officer 
elections for a person that they will likely never see in person.  Presumably this effect would be stronger 
still if the decisionmaker were choosing a person with whom he or she would be working. 
71 Hamermesh and Biddle (1994). 
72 Averett and Korenman (1996).   35
V. DISCRIMINATION VERSUS DISPARITIES 
 
Continued concern about the existence and consequences of discrimination is 
primarily driven by large and enduring racial/ethnic disparities in poverty and 
unemployment rates as well as earnings and wealth.  For example, 22.7 percent of all 
blacks earned wages below the poverty line in 2001 as opposed to only 9.9 percent of 
whites.
73 For decades, black unemployment rates have typically been twice those of 
whites: recent data in December 2002 shows the unemployment rate was 11.5 percent for 
blacks and only 5.1 percent for whites.
74 For full-time workers, the median white male 
full-time worker had an income of $40,790 in 2001 while the median black male full-
time worker only made $31,921 (see Table 1).  Moreover, racial disparities in wealth are 
vastly greater. 
  Wide gaps in various employment measures also exist between male and female 
workers.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the employment-to-population ratio for females was 
56.3 percent in December 2002 but 68.8 percent for males.
75 Even for full-time workers 
who worked the entire year, women earned less than men: the median male full-time 
white worker had an income of $40,790 in 2001, while white female workers earned only 
$30,849.
76  The comparable numbers for black full-time, full-year workers were $31,921 
for men and $27,297 for women, as shown in Table 1.  Note that black men are earning 
more on average than white women. 
Table 1 indicates that blacks (both male and female) made considerable progress 
in narrowing the earnings gap for full-time, full-year workers (FTFY) in the decade 
following the implementation of Title VII (from 1965 to 1975).  During that decade, this 
black-white earnings gap narrowed to roughly 75 percent for men and 95 percent for 
women.  Since 1975, the earnings growth of black women has not kept pace with white 
women, although FTFY black men have kept pace with white men (and even narrowed 
the gap to 78 percent by 2001, although the weakening of the economy thereafter may 
have undercut this progress to some degree).
77 
Two other notable points can be seen in Table 1, although significant selection 
effects are likely operating in both cases.  First, while their declining earnings ratio 
suggests that Hispanics have lost out relative to whites in the 1990s, the huge influx of 
low-skilled, low-education Hispanics obscures this comparison.  Note that the number of 
Hispanics in FTFY employment more than doubled between 1988 and 2001.  Second, the 
table reveals that Asians have done extremely well in the labor market, but immigration 
may have generated the opposite selection effect from the Hispanic in-migration.  Asian 
FTFY employment also more than doubled over the 1988-2001 period. The selection of 
Asian immigrants from the right tail of the skill distribution at least raises the possibility 
that if one controlled for education and hours worked, one might also observe an 
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74 See Table B-42 of The Economic Report of the President (2003). 
75 See Table B-39 of The Economic Report of the President (2003). 
76 Part of this disparity is explained by the fact that, on average, male full-time, full-year workers work 
longer hours than female full-time, full-year workers. 
77 Greater rates of departure from the labor market by lower wage black men may have artificially 
improved these black-white earnings ratios to some degree. See Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2005).  
Couch and Daly (2002) conclude that the black-white wage gap had indeed narrowed in the 1990s and by 
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unexplained earnings shortfall for Asians.  Nonetheless, it is striking that Table 1 reveals 
that the raw median earnings ratios for FTFY workers show Asians at or above the white 
levels (despite the difficulties imposed by the need to learn English for some recent 
immigrants).   
   Clearly, there are substantial disparities in earnings and other economic and social 
outcomes among groups, but, of course, labor market disparities can exist even in the 
absence of employment discrimination.  Indeed, one of the greatest challenges in 
ascertaining the presence of employment discrimination is that most employment 
discrimination cases are filed by groups that we would expect to have lower earnings 
even in the absence of discrimination.  For example, lower socioeconomic status 
correlates with lower levels of education obtained in lower quality schools and, 
consequently, lower levels of human capital attainment, which is an unfortunate fact of 
life in America for many blacks and Hispanics.  While one would not expect to see 
women disadvantaged in schooling (at least in this country), the fact that women become 
pregnant and tend to assume primary care for young children imposes burdens on them 
that male employees less frequently shoulder.  The result is that hiring female workers of 
a certain age predictably imposes certain higher costs on employers that are not borne if 
male workers are hired.
78  Obviously, individuals with physical or mental disabilities, 
medical conditions, or advanced age will have attributes that for many jobs will be less 
attractive to employers, again even in the absence of “discrimination.”  To the extent that 
the baseline for determining disparate impact is equality among groups that are not 
equally productive, employment discrimination law becomes a mechanism for providing 
preferences in the guise of enforcing an antidiscrimination mandate.
79  To the extent that 
the protected groups are encumbered by taste-based discrimination in addition to the 
productivity-based reasons for lower pay or other differential treatment, then the current 
approach of unacknowledged preferences may be helping to achieve the non-
discriminatory equilibrium.  If, however, the degree of preference exceeds any true 
economically discriminatory disadvantage, then the law is providing welfare benefits 
through the antidiscrimination framework.
80 
                                                 
78 Males of course have their own disadvantages in that they tend to be more violent and more prone to 
criminal conduct than women are.  Age and marriage, as discussed below, seem to dampen these antisocial 
tendencies.  Moreover, the percentage of males that engage in serious antisocial conduct is substantially 
lower than the percentage of women who have children, so employers may be able more effectively to 
identify less desirable male employees. 
79 In a disparate treatment case, a plaintiff would ordinarily buttress the claim of intentional discrimination 
with a simple showing that the protected group was being treated less favorably than the comparison group 
and that this difference was statistically significant.  The same calculation would ordinarily be made in a 
disparate impact case, although the employer would argue that there was no disparate impact as long as the 
relevant rate for the protected group was at least 80 percent of the rate of the comparison group.  Thus, if an 
employer hired 20 percent of white applicants and 17 percent of black applicants, the employer would 
invoke the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 80 percent rule to argue there was no disparate 
impact.  See Meier et al. (1984). 
80 Providing welfare benefits through the antidiscrimination apparatus tends to target the benefits to the 
elite members of the protected classes rather than the neediest members of such classes.  This has some 
obvious undesirable distributional consequences but may have offsetting external benefits if the visible 
advancement of the elite members both undermines stereotypic attitudes about members of the protected 
classes and serves a useful mentoring or role-modeling effect.  For example, readily visible black economic 
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This brief discussion underscores that disparity is not a sufficient condition for the 
existence of discrimination.  While discrimination can and has contributed to racial and 
ethnic inequity in earnings, the mere presence of such a disparity does not establish the 
presence of discrimination.  For example, differences between racial or ethnic groups in 
basic levels of education or even earlier differences in pre-natal exposures to drugs and 
alcohol can lead to disparities in ultimate outcomes even in the absence of any invidious 
discrimination.
81  Conversely, the absence of discrimination in one stage does not 
eliminate the possibility that discrimination was present and caused harm at some earlier 
stage.  Thus, disparities observed in the labor market may not reflect discrimination in 
that domain, but could be generated by discrimination that occurred in a prior sphere 
(health, housing and education, for example).  A growing literature has tried to ascertain 
what portion of the large disparities in economic welfare between men and women, 
whites and non-whites, and among other classes of protected individuals stems from 
discrimination and what is the product of differences in human capital, personal 
preferences, and ambitions.
82   
Some articles focusing on earnings disparities between gay and heterosexual 
workers illustrate these issues.  We know that many individuals and employers 
discriminate against gays (the U.S. military for one), although one consequence of the 
widespread bias is that many gays do not advertise their sexual orientation to employers.  
How does this bias influence the labor market outcomes of gay workers?  Using simple 
earnings regressions, one study found that “lesbian women earn more than comparable 
single and married women, while gay men earn less than their married male counterparts 
and also perhaps somewhat less than comparable single heterosexual men.”
83  Assuming 
that such findings are correct, how are they to be interpreted?  In general, it appears that 
married men earn more than both straight unmarried men and gay men (the latter two 
earning about the same).
84  Does this show that being gay doesn’t matter at all and the 
only important stimulant to earnings for a man is being married (to a woman)?  Perhaps 
married men are simply more attached to the labor force, so that they work a greater 
portion of the year and more hours while working.  One might suspect that married men 
work harder or more reliably because they need to support a family.  Alternatively, the 
married men may not work harder but may simply bargain harder or more effectively 
given the ability to reference family needs as a justification for higher earnings.  Since 
lesbians earn more than married women, the various earnings disparities are clearly not 
explained by a simple story of discrimination against gays -- again one suspects that 
marriage (at least when accompanied by child rearing) facilitates a sexual division of 
labor that probably leads to higher earnings for men and lower earnings for women as 
husbands focus more on work and wives concentrate on family matters.
85   
                                                 
81 Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2005). 
82 See Blank et al. (2004). 
83 Black et al. (2003). 
84 Allegretto and Arthur (2001) uses 1990 Census data and finds that gay men in unmarried partnered 
relationships earned 15.6 percent less than similarly qualified married heterosexual men and 2.4 percent 
less than similarly qualified unmarried, partnered heterosexual men.  
85 Posner (1989) argues that because women and men are economically linked (through marriage or 
relationships), the shortfall in earnings of women is less problematic than, say, the shortfall in earnings 
experienced by blacks, who do not have the same strong economic interdependency with whites. While 
Posner’s point may lessen the sting of lower earnings for women it does not eliminate the impact on   38
Thus, it may be unsurprising that lesbians earn more than married women, but 
why they earn more than unmarried women is potentially more puzzling (one assumes 
discrimination is not the explanation).  Perhaps, the anticipation of the marriage effect by 
single women who plan to marry (and therefore feel less of a need to invest in their 
careers) explains why they earn less than gay women.  It is also worth speculating 
whether being gay influences preferences in ways that might impact earnings.  For 
example, one could examine the collegiate educational choices of gay and straight 
individuals to see if lesbians choose majors more often selected by straight men than 
straight women (e.g., more business and economics and less art and sociology), and, 
conversely, whether gay men choose undergraduate majors more like straight women 
than straight men.  The bottom line is that an analysis will need many steps of elaboration 
before a finding of disparity can be taken as proof of discrimination. 
  
VI. MEASURING THE EXTENT OF DISCRIMINATION 
 
Psychologists have argued that the aforementioned implicit attitudes test reveals 
that most Americans harbor unconscious bias against blacks.  Experimental studies in 
which individuals were put in situations in which they needed help reveal that both 
whites and blacks frequently are more likely to give aid to their own race than to the 
opposite race.
86  Researchers have tested for the presence of discrimination in an 
enormous array of settings, and typically conclude that some discrimination against 
blacks (and perhaps against Hispanics) is present.  For example, discrimination has been 
uncovered in car buying, access to kidney transplants, and tipping in taxicabs.
87  In 
general, as we saw earlier, raw (or unadjusted) disparities across racial groups are often 
considerable.  Nonetheless, because of the difficulties in trying to control for legitimate 
nondiscriminatory factors in regression analyses, most crude documentations of racial (or 
other) disparities probably overstate the presence of discrimination. 
 
A. Regression  Studies 
Regression analysis is frequently used to ascertain whether earnings disparities 
can be fully explained by various explanatory variables.  These efforts to control for 
some of the non-discriminatory reasons for such disparities (such as lower levels of 
human capital attainment) tend to shrink the disparities considerably.  This leaves the 
researcher with the nagging concern that any remaining disparities after adjustment may 
not reflect discrimination, but only the imprecision of the controls.  For example, many 
studies use earnings regressions of the following form to test for discrimination: 
 
) 1 or    1 ( ) ln( = = + + = sex black X earnings δ β α   
 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables including observable traits such as age and 
years of education.  If the observable controls can capture all the factors that both 
                                                                                                                                                 
women if bargaining within the family is influenced by each partner’s individual contribution to family 
wealth or if, in the (common) event of marital dissolution, divorce law inadequately protects women’s 
contributions to family well-being.  
86 Crosby, Bromley, and Saxe (1980). 
87 Ayres and Siegelman (1995), Ayres (2001) and Ayres, Vars, and Zakariya (2005).   39
influence earnings and are correlated with race or sex, then δ provides a consistent 
estimate of the percentage shortfall in earnings resulting from discrimination.  But the 
observable variables are crudely measured in a way that overestimates the likely human 
capital of women and minorities so that the estimate of δ is likely more negative than is 
in fact the case.  For example, age may not be a good proxy for work experience for those 
(such as women) who may have spent many years out of the labor market.  Indeed, the 
enormous increase in the incarceration of blacks means that age may considerably 
overstate years of human capital accumulation for blacks vis-à-vis whites.  Similarly, 
years of education may not be an ideal proxy for human capital in estimating racial 
disparities if whites are attending substantially higher quality schools.  In both cases, the 
coefficient δ on the race or gender dummy may be statistically significant, but its value 
might drop to insignificance (or conceivably even reverse sign) if better controls for years 
of job experience and for quality of education could be found.  Indeed, statistical tests for 
discrimination confront researchers with the vexing and opposing problems of omitted 
variable bias (where the inability to capture all of the factors that affect productivity can 
exaggerate the unexplained residuals in earnings functions) versus multicollinearity 
(where many of the included variables that proxy for productivity are highly correlated 
with race or sex).  Many factors that could lead to greater productivity and that are 
correlated with race or gender may be left out of standard earnings equations.  As a result, 
most regression studies only succeed in generating an unexplained residual in the 
earnings equations rather than identifying with precision the shortfall in wages caused by 
discrimination.
88 
  The raw comparisons of the relative earnings of black and white full-time workers 
are considerable (roughly 22 percent in 2001), as are the raw disparities for the other 
groups listed in Table 1.  Not surprisingly, a portion of these disparities can be explained 
as regression studies control for various human capital differences.  If everything can be 
explained by legitimate human capital factors, the case that discrimination is still harming 
blacks and other groups is weakened.  For example, Altonji and Blank (1999) estimate 
racial, ethnic, and gender disparities (using 1995 CPS data) while controlling for 
education, potential experience, region, occupation, and industry.  Their finding is that 
blacks suffer a 9 percentage point shortfall; Hispanics, 10 percentage points; and women, 
22 percent.  The big questions about these regression results for blacks and Hispanics are 
whether years of education can capture the difference in schooling quality for the 
different populations, and whether some better measure of human capital attainment is 
needed.  For women, the big questions are whether potential experience can be an 
adequate control since time off for childrearing can dampen years of actual experience 
considerably and whether differing female job preferences undermine the validity of the 
male-female regression results. 
 
  B.  The Debate over the Current Degree of Discrimination 
  The competing positions in the vigorous debate concerning the significance of 
race and sex discrimination in the contemporary labor market were well-captured in an 
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maximize their own earnings, such as the decisions of many wives to focus more on the family than their 
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than labor market discrimination.   40
excellent symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (JEP).  In that exchange, 
William Darity and Patrick Mason aligned with Kenneth Arrow in arguing that 
discrimination is still widespread and significantly diminishes the economic opportunities 
of women and minorities, while James Heckman disagreed with this assessment.  Many 
non-economists are highly resistant to Heckman’s position because they heard this claim 
made by earlier University of Chicago economists at a time when it clearly was not true.  
The view was that the market would eliminate discriminators so discrimination can’t be a 
substantial problem.  This was analogous to arguing based on principles of aerodynamics 
that bumble bees can’t fly, and the economics profession was probably justly given a 
black eye for elevating selected theory over unassailable empirical evidence.  It must be 
remembered, though, that Heckman did not accept the Chicago orthodoxy when the 
empirical evidence refuted it, and he has written some of the major papers establishing 
the burdens of discrimination on blacks during the Jim Crow period and beyond, as 
discussed in Section III (A) above and Section VIII (A) below.  Therefore, simply 
because discrimination was once a major impediment to economic advances by blacks 
and women does not necessarily mean that it remains so in the very different legal and 
economic environment that exists today.  (Conversely, even if the current impact of 
existing labor market discrimination is small, one cannot simply assume that this would 
be the case if antidiscrimination laws were eliminated.)  Heckman no longer believes that 
market discrimination substantially contributes to the black-white wage gap (as it once 
clearly did), and therefore he doubts that at present racial discrimination in the labor 
market is a first-order problem in the United States.  Rather, Heckman looks to other 
factors (i.e., those that promote skill formation) to explain the black-white earnings gap – 
a theme that he builds on in Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2005).  The following 
discussion will summarize the competing evidence amassed in the JEP symposium.  
  Darity and Mason (1998) cite articles that estimate earnings functions using 
Census data that show unexplained disparities for women and minorities, which they 
interpret as a measure of discrimination.  For the reasons discussed above, Heckman is 
skeptical that regression analysis of Census data is able to discern the extent of labor 
market discrimination against black workers.
89  Heckman also notes the disparity 
between the list of human capital characteristics used to measure a difference in earnings 
that are available in standard data sets, such as those provided by the Census, and the 
more complete list of characteristics available to employers when they make their 
employment decisions.  Of course, even if current labor market discrimination is not a 
major impediment to blacks, discrimination in public education or housing could still be a 
factor, as could a set of choices by blacks that would not have been made in a non-
discriminatory environment. 
In arguing for the relative unimportance of labor market discrimination in 
effecting black economic outcomes today, Heckman (1998) instead relies on an important 
set of articles that correct for the problem of omitted productivity variables by adding to 
the earnings functions the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) to measure an 
important dimension of worker quality.  These articles have found that the previously 
unexplained earnings disparities are eliminated by the inclusion of this human capital 
measure.  Heckman contends that the studies purporting to show the existence of racial 
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discrimination are flawed by their failure to adequately control for underlying racial 
differences in human capital attainment.   
Darity and Mason remain unconvinced by these articles, arguing that “the results 
obtained by O’Neill (1990), Maxwell (1994), Ferguson (1995), and Neal and Johnson 
(1996) after using the AFQT as an explanatory variable are, upon closer examination, not 
robust to alternative specifications and are quite difficult to interpret.”
90  Specifically, 
Darity and Mason contend that there is a conceptual flaw in Neal and Johnson’s earnings 
equation in that it controls for age and the AFQT but does not control for education.  
Both Darity and Mason as well as Lang and Manove (2004) have found that when the 
control for education is added to the earnings equation a black-white wage gap 
reemerges.  The contrasting findings, then, are not in dispute but there is debate over their 
proper interpretation.  If the AFQT measures aptitude and years of schooling measures 
additional productivity attributes such as acquired skill or knowledge, (as well as 
motivation or perseverance), then both the AFQT and years of schooling should be 
included in the regression.  In this case, the racial gap in earnings is significant.  But, 
Heckman supports Neal and Johnson in the view that the AFQT score captures the 
contribution to productivity of intelligence and education and that therefore it is 
inappropriate to also include years of education in these earnings functions.  The Neal 
and Johnson specification that Heckman endorses eliminates the racial gap in earnings. 
Ross (2003) addresses the issue as follows:  “Johnson and Neal control for the age of the 
individual [at the time of the AFQT test], but they did not control for the education of the 
individual when he or she took the AFQT.  While [arguably] education should not be 
included in the wage specification, it is certainly important to remove the influence of 
educational differences on AFQT performance if one is to obtain a measure of pre-market 
ability.  When this correction is made the influence of prejudice on earnings is 11 
percentage points.” 
Similarly, Darity and Mason argue that measures of psychological well-being 
should be included in wage equations.  They claim that their inclusion again causes the 
black-white wage gap to resurface.  They also find that the results of the above-cited 
“AFQT studies” are not robust since using the math and verbal subcomponents of the 
AFQT leads to conflicting implications for discriminatory differentials.  Given these 
flaws, Darity and Mason do not trust the results of studies based on the AFQT data.  Even 
though the results may suggest that there has been a decrease in the black-white wage 
gap, the authors assert that blacks still suffer from discrimination in the employment 
market. 
  In addition to their claim that the aggregated regression data document the 
existence of race and sex discrimination, Darity and Mason argue that the evidence from 
selected discrimination lawsuits and audit pair studies further buttress this conclusion.  
They highlight the 1996 Texaco case as the most notorious in recent years in which top 
corporate officials were caught on tape making highly demeaning remarks about blacks, 
which then translated into discriminatory employment practices.  Similar evidence was 
uncovered about the racist language and behavior of Ray Danner, who was the CEO of 
the restaurant chain Shoney’s.
91 
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Darity and Mason summarize the findings of five separate audit-pair studies 
assessing race and sex discrimination, noting: 
•  The Urban Institute audits from the early 1990s found that both black and 
Hispanic males were three times as likely to be turned down from a job as 
white males. 
•  Bendick, Jackson, and Reinoso (1994) found that whites were 10 percent 
more likely to receive job interviews than blacks, half of the white 
interviewees received job offers versus 11 percent of the black 
interviewees, and blacks who did receive jobs were offered 15 cents per 
hour less than whites. 
•  The Fair Employment Council found that both Hispanic and black women 
were three times as likely to encounter discrimination when compared to 
Hispanic or black males, respectively. 
•  To address the methodological complaints of Heckman and Siegelman 
(1993) that audit pairing fails to adequately hold constant all relevant 
traits, Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort (1995) designed a study to eliminate 
personality and appearance variables by relying on manipulated resumes 
sent to selected employers (restaurants).  The results show that a man 
always had a higher probability of receiving a job offer, and Darity and 
Mason interpret this to mean that within a particular occupation, gender 
discrimination is still prevalent.   
•  Goldin and Rouse (1997) found that hiding the identity of orchestra 
applicants (behind a screen) raised the probability that a female musician 
was selected by 50 percent. 
    
Heckman emphasizes that the evidence from the audit studies must be evaluated 
in light of the distinction between market discrimination and individual discrimination.  
He stresses that the “impact of market discrimination is not determined by the most 
discriminatory participants in the market nor by the average level of discrimination 
among firms, but rather by the level of discrimination at the firms where ethnic minorities 
or women actually end up buying, working, and borrowing.”  That is, market 
discrimination occurs at the margin.  While the audit studies can establish that a certain 
percentage of employers are discriminatory, this does not imply that there will be any 
effective market discrimination in an active labor market.  If lots of employers refuse to 
hire Jews, but there are others who don’t share this view, Jews may suffer no shortfall in 
earnings.  Therefore, since Heckman concludes from the AFQT studies that blacks are 
receiving wages consistent with their productivity, he is skeptical of the importance of the 
audit study findings that some percentage of employers harbors discriminatory attitudes 
towards blacks. 
In addition, Heckman argues that the audit pair studies may not correctly achieve 
even the more limited goal of identifying individual examples of discriminatory conduct.  
Heckman notes the following weaknesses in the audit studies: 
•  Audit pair studies have primarily been conducted for hiring in entry-level jobs 
in certain low skill occupations using overqualified college students during 
summer vacations. 
•  Audit pair studies do not sample subsequent promotion decisions.   43
•  Since only jobs found through newspapers clippings are audited, other 
avenues of securing work are underrepresented. 
Heckman is also uncomfortable with some of the methodological assumptions that 
underlie the audit pair methodology.  It is quite unlikely that all characteristics affecting 
productivity can be perfectly matched between two job candidates.  If, because of the 
effort required to match the candidates, the researcher assumes that they have equal 
strength on all characteristics, she can mistakenly assume discrimination where there is 
none.  For example, if the black auditors are better at Skill X but the white auditors are 
better at Skill Y, an audit researcher who equalizes blacks and whites only on Skill X will 
find discriminatory practices in firms (that are in fact looking for Skill Y workers) even 
when there is no discrimination.   
  In the end, Heckman believes that more strenuous enforcement of civil rights laws 
will henceforth be a costly and ineffective way to narrow the black-white wage gap.  
Rather, efforts should focus on enriching family and preschool environments so that 
skills are strengthened before job candidates enter the market.  The need for early 
intervention is highlighted by the recent findings of Fryer and Levitt (2005: 5):  “By the 
end of third grade, even after controlling for observables, the black-white test score gap is 
evident in every skill tested in reading and math…. The largest racial gaps in third grade 
are in the skills most crucial to future academic and labor market success:  multiplication 
and division in math, and inference, extrapolation, and evaluation in reading.  Any initial 
optimism is drowned out by the growing gap.” 
 
  C.  Some New Audit Pair Studies 
A recent study by Devah Pager concludes that the degree of discrimination in 
employment is so great that blacks without criminal records are treated as badly as whites 
with criminal records.
92  The Pager study has been widely cited as establishing the 
existence of a high level of discrimination, but there are some reasons for caution in 
interpreting this work.  This study employs an experimental audit approach, varying only 
criminal record, to chronicle the success of candidates’ interviews in Milwaukee.  Using 
matched pairs of individuals, the author is able to control for other characteristics and 
isolate the effect of the criminal record alone.  Pager finds that a criminal record has a 
substantial effect on employment opportunities, particularly for black applicants.   
  Pager’s audit experiment involved four male participants, two blacks and two 
whites, applying for entry-level job openings.  The auditors formed two teams such that 
the members of each team were of the same race.
93  The teams applied to 15 jobs per 
week and the final data included 150 applications by the white pair and 200 by the black 
pair.
94  The auditors applied to the jobs and advanced as far as they could during the first 
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93 The auditors were chosen based on similarity of characteristics, and all background information was 
made similar for the job applications.  The only difference in the application was that one of the testers in 
each team was assigned a criminal record, a felony drug conviction, and 18 months of prison.  The member 
of each team with the criminal record was rotated on a weekly basis to control for any unobserved 
differences.  Both members of a team would apply for the same job, one day apart with the order 
determined randomly.   
94 The job openings were all within 25 miles of downtown Milwaukee and were selected from the classified 
section of a Milwaukee newspaper and a state-sponsored internet job service.  The project occurred   44
visit.  The application was considered a success only if the auditors were called back for a 
second interview or hired.   
  The results showed that 34 percent of whites with no criminal record were called 
back while only 17 percent of those with a criminal record were; 14 percent of blacks 
without a criminal record were called back while only 5 percent with a criminal record 
were.  Notably, the black auditor without a criminal record received a smaller percentage 
of callbacks than the white auditor with a criminal record, suggesting the presence of 
substantial discrimination against blacks in general.  Note that the extent of the disparity 
that Pager found was quite a bit higher than that found in other audit pair studies in the 
employment realm.  One issue to consider is that same-race pairs would visit the same 
employers but the cross-race pairs visit different employers.  This is an efficient protocol 
for testing the impact of a criminal record on labor market success but a less efficient 
method for testing for race discrimination.  Nonetheless, Pager notes that black and white 
testers were carefully matched to each other as if they were participating on the same 
team, so that these estimates should be unbiased even if less efficient.  Moreover, while 
there may be some heterogeneity among the employer samples tested by each pair, even 
after random assignment, Pager’s approach yields an offsetting advantage:  the black pair 
and the white pair were able to use identical sets of resumes, which would not have been 
possible had they been visiting the same employers.
95  Another concern, albeit one about 
which Pager is well-aware, is the possibility of experimenter effects in in-person audit 
studies. When the variables of interest, i.e. race and criminal record, are known to the 
auditors, there is potential for bias if the person conducting the study signals even subtly 
what the study hopes to accomplish.
96 
A closely related technique is used in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) to 
measure the extent of race-based labor market discrimination.  Employing a so-called 
correspondence test methodology, they submitted about 5,000 fictitious resumes in 
response to nearly 1,300 employment advertisements posted in The Boston Globe and 
The Chicago Tribune.  Their experiment was designed to estimate the racial gap in 
response rates, measured by phone calls or emails requesting an interview.  The authors 
deliberately chose a correspondence test in order to circumvent some of the weaknesses 
associated with audit studies, such as the confounding effects of human interaction in a 
face-to-face interview and the difficulty of “matching” two different individuals.  
Randomly assigning traditionally black or white names to resumes, on the other hand, 
ensures 1) race remains the only component that varies for a given resume and 2) 
heterogeneous responses to behavior or appearance do not affect outcomes (as often 
occurs with human auditors).   
The Bertrand and Mullainathan paper also differs from specific features of 
Pager’s audit study.  First, they analyze hiring practices for two large cities in different 
regions of the country.  In addition, they submitted four applications to each employer, 
                                                                                                                                                 
between June and December 2001 and focused on a range of entry-level jobs, such as restaurant workers 
and production workers. 
95 The resumes of test partners were similar but not identical. 
96 This is the “experimenter” effect that Heckman and Siegelman (1993) discuss in the context of the Urban 
Institute audit studies and that social psychologists have long recognized and stressed.   45
one for each race/quality cell.
97  Bertrand and Mullainathan submitted applications for 
three occupational categories -- sales, clerical services, and administrative support --  
while Pager’s study includes entry-level sales and clerical positions, restaurant and 
warehouse jobs, customer service positions, and cashiers.  Finally, and perhaps most 
important, differences in race can only be inferred by the employer in the Bertrand and 
Mullainathan study.  Since no personal contact with the potential employer ever takes 
place, Bertrand and Mullainathan randomly assign names that are typically or exclusively 
associated with blacks or whites.
98  As the authors note, the correspondence test—like 
most audit studies—captures only the initial stage of the hiring process and excludes 
other important sources of employment news such as social networks.  One drawback to 
this approach is that it can only address jobs in which mailed resumes is an appropriate 
application method, which may miss lower level jobs where discrimination at the point of 
hire may be most acute. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan find significant differences in callback rates for whites 
and blacks: “applicants with White names need to send about 10 resumes to get one 
callback whereas applicants with African-American names need to send about 15 
resumes.”
99  Put differently, the advantage of having a distinctly white name translates 
into roughly eight additional years of experience in the eyes of a potential employer.  
Whites also appear to benefit much more than blacks from possessing the skills and 
attributes of a high-quality applicant and from living in a wealthier or whiter 
neighborhood.
100   
Although these results represent compelling evidence of labor market 
discrimination, it is important to bear in mind the study’s underlying assumptions, 
particularly the likelihood that distinctive names map as expected to racial identity in the 
minds of potential employers.  The results of Fryer and Levitt (2004) also indicate that 
distinctive names do not disadvantage blacks for a variety of adult outcomes.  They offer 
some potential arguments for reconciling their findings with those of Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2004).  First, if names are considered a noisy initial indicator of race, then 
they should have no effect once a candidate arrives for the interview.
101  Second, if 
distinctively black names damaged labor market prospects, one might observe more name 
changes than appear to occur.  Finally, with only about 10 percent of jobs being secured 
through formal resume-submission processes, the disadvantage of being screened out by 
                                                 
97 Quality, which can either be “high” or “low,” refers to a subjective classification of attributes across a 
range of standard resume components.  For example, a high-quality applicant might possess (among others) 
an email address, computer skills, honors and volunteer or military experience. 
98 Bertrand and Mullainathan express concern that employers might not recognize racial identities based on 
distinctive names and that such labeling may not reflect the identity of the average African-American.  
However, an informal survey of Chicago residents confirmed that people associate their list of distinctive 
names with the expected race. 
99 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). 
100 The difference in callback rates between high and low quality whites is 2.3 percentage points, while for 
blacks the difference is a meager one half of one percentage point.    
101 Fryer and Levitt also hint at the possibility that discrimination at the resume submission stage against 
individuals with distinctively black names will reduce the search costs of those applicants and perhaps 
direct them more rapidly toward employers that prefer to hire blacks.  Still, this saving in search costs may 
come at a price if it eliminates the opportunity for high-quality black applicants to present themselves in a 
manner that will dampen the employer’s discriminatory response.   46
certain employers may not be high when other employers and other job search paths 
remain open. 
  The combination of the audit studies and the better regression studies seems to tell 
us that (1) there are enough discriminators around that blacks do have to search harder to 
find employment, (2) the resulting unexplained earnings shortfall is not terribly high, and 
(3) the unexplained earnings shortfall will overstate discrimination if other legitimate 
factors are omitted, but will understate the cost of discrimination to blacks because they 
bear the added search costs and any attendant psychological burden that it imposes.  
Eliminating discrimination could bridge that earnings gap and remove the added search 
costs, but this would still leave a substantial unadjusted disparity in black and white 
earnings.  Heckman is trying to emphasize that current black earnings shortfalls should be 
thought of as emanating more importantly from lower levels of human and cultural 
capital, and that efforts to address those deficits will yield greater rewards than further 
heightened antidiscrimination measures in the labor market.  Heckman fears that efforts 
to aid groups that have been languishing in socio-economic attainment will be more 
impeded rather than advanced by a predominant focus on discrimination. 
 
VII. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW IN PRACTICE 
 
Rather than a focus on ability enhancement, which Heckman would prefer, the 
theoretical goal of antidiscrimination law is the attainment of the equilibrium that would 
exist in the counterfactual world in which every individual retained his or her same 
abilities but the employer (or purchaser) was somehow prevented from observing any of 
the prohibited traits (such as race or sex). This equilibrium is given by point A in Figure 
1.
102  In effect, this implies that the legislation is premised on the view that discriminatory 
preferences should not be registered in the social calculus and that any benefits that occur 
from taste-based or even statistical discrimination should be foregone.  Since the 
antidiscrimination regime is implemented largely through private litigation, it is 
encumbered by all of the costs of any litigation-based scheme in which motives are 
highly relevant to determining liability.  Thus, post hoc decision-makers must determine 
whether protected workers have been fired because of their protected 
race/gender/age/disability or for some other legitimate reason such as their shortcomings 
relative to other available workers.  Obviously, this type of litigation is costly and prone 
to error. 
The effort to discern the motive of employers may be particularly difficult 
because (as considerable psychological evidence suggests) much discrimination is 
unconscious.  This implies that an employer might believe that he or she has not 
discriminated even when discrimination has occurred.  The difficulty this poses for a trier 
of fact is clear: if the employer doesn’t know that he or she has acted in a discriminatory 
way, how easily can the jury discern this fact?  Certainly demeanor evidence at trial 
would be misleading if an employer who sincerely believes there has been no 
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level of wages and employment than would exist in a wholly nondiscriminatory environment.  See 
Donohue (1994).   47
discrimination did in fact discriminate.  The inability to readily and accurately identify 
intentional discrimination provides a rationale for the disparate impact doctrine and 
reliance on statistical proof of discrimination.  Statistical models are informative about 
the probability that an observed disparity would occur if workers were selected in a 
random process.  Statistically significant disparities therefore suggest that the likelihood 
that the observed employment patterns emerged from a random process is low.  Such a 
finding, however, does not always provide useful evidence that the non-random process 
was discriminatory: underlying differences in productivity may be correlated with race 
yet not accounted for in the statistical model.  Therefore, reliance on statistical models to 
prove intentional discrimination will likely generate too high a level of Type I error 
(where the innocent employer is wrongfully found to have discriminated).  Assuming 
reverse discrimination lawsuits are possible, the standard level of statistical significance 
(5 percent) would indict 5 percent of all employers, even with purely random 
employment selection.  Not using statistical evidence, though, increases the risk of Type 
II error (where the unlawfully discriminating employer avoids sanction).  Presumably, 
markets will provide some discipline on employers who engage in unconscious 
discrimination, so in evaluating the costs and benefits of antidiscrimination law the 
imperfect market sanction needs to be compared with the imperfect legal remedy. 
Antidiscrimination law may also undermine the efficient use of statistical 
discrimination, thereby lowering overall wealth to the extent that statistical 
discrimination has real cost advantages to employers seeking to minimize the cost of 
selecting their workforce.
103  Moreover, the prohibition on statistical discrimination can 
potentially turn antidiscrimination law into a mechanism for generating preferential 
treatment of protected workers.  As we have seen, the law clearly prevents an employer 
from acting on the knowledge that most women will leave the labor market when they 
have children.  If women and men were otherwise identical, then burdens of childbearing 
would imply that, on average, the marginal product of men would be higher than that of 
women.  Requiring that employers ignore this fact tends to increase the demand for 
female workers beyond what it would be if the outcome could be reached in which all 
animus against women was absent.  This highlights a difference between an economic 
and a legal definition of discrimination, since economists would say that an employer 
who pays a class of workers $x less because on average the members of that class impose 
$x greater costs on the employer is not discriminating.  Indeed, the economist would 
likely say that in this scenario, if the employer did not pay less to this class of workers, 
then the employer would be discriminating in favor of this group.  Thus, the legal 
definition would mandate economic discrimination by requiring that male and female 
workers must receive equal compensation and employment despite this productivity 
differential. Similar issues arise for racial and ethnic minorities (their relative poverty has 
led to less desirable school options and hence lower human capital attainment), the 
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elderly (on average they are slowing down), and the disabled (at the very least they 
require reasonable accommodation). 
The previous discussion suggests an inherent tension in employment 
discrimination law.  If, in the economist’s terms, employers are appropriately paying 
members of a certain group less because on average the members of that group are either 
less productive or more costly to employ, then the legal requirement not to discriminate 
will be in tension with the economic incentives faced by employers.  In essence, a 
tradeoff emerges between the equal hiring requirement and the equal wage requirement.  
If, as is generally believed, the latter is more binding, then the law may actually dampen 
employment while raising wages of those who secure employment (the “minimum wage” 
scenario).   There is empirical support for the view that antidiscrimination laws may help 
those who keep jobs while reducing the total number of jobs.  In general, the minimum 
wage effect predicts higher wages and lower employment for protected workers, while 
the equal hiring component suggests that protected workers will experience some demand 
stimulus.  The bottom line is that both factors predict higher wages for protected workers 
but the employment effects are ambiguous depending on whether the demand stimulus 
offsets the incentive to cut back on more costly workers. 
 
 VIII.  THE IMPACT OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW ON BLACK ECONOMIC 
WELFARE  
 
A.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Black Employment 
As previously noted, the major law prohibiting employment discrimination on the 
basis of race, sex, religion, and national origin was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Congress later broadened the coverage of this statute when it enacted the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) of 1972, and then further expanded federal 
antidiscrimination law (primarily in providing greater damage remedies for successful 
sex discrimination plaintiffs and workers discharged because of their race) in passing the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.  The 1964 Act has received the most scholarly attention for it 
was clearly the most momentous piece of antidiscrimination law ever enacted.  Initially, 
James Smith and Finis Welch attempted to carry the mantle of Milton Friedman by 
arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had not advanced black economic welfare.
104  
The thrust of the argument was simply that blacks had low skill levels and little education 
and as they secured more human capital their wages rose appropriately.  Smith and 
Welch argued that the economic gains of blacks were no different during the period from 
1940 through 1960 than they were in the following two decades.  They took this as 
evidence against the view that Title VII generated any benefits for black workers.   
More nuanced examinations of this issue have now confirmed that Title VII did 
indeed generate economic gains for blacks, although these gains were largely 
concentrated in the first ten years after adoption and in the South.  As Donohue and 
Heckman (1991) note:  
 
“the evidence of sustained economic advance for blacks over the period 1965-
1975 is not inconsistent with the fact that the racial wage gap declined by similar 
amounts in the two decades following 1940 as in the two decades following 1960.  
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The long-term picture from at least 1920-1990 has been one of black relative 
stagnation with the exception of two periods – that around World War II and that 
following the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”  
 
It is now widely accepted that in helping to break down the extreme discriminatory 
patterns of the Jim Crow South, Title VII did considerably increase the demand for black 




B.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) of 1972 
As the literature examining the effects of Title VII illustrates, attempts to estimate 
the impact of a federal law that has universal application at a single date in time are 
difficult, since any perceived changes may at least arguably be the product not of law but 
of broader shifts in the economy or society that either led to the legal change or just 
happened to coincide with it.  Differential geographic impact turned out to strongly 
buttress the conclusion that Title VII mattered.  The area of the country that had no 
antidiscrimination law in 1964 and that fought desperately against the passage of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act was the South, and it was this region that experienced the most 
profound narrowing of the black-white wage gap after the federal law took effect.  A 
recent, interesting effort addresses these issues in attempting to determine whether the 
EEOA, which broadened the coverage of Title VII in 1972, provided additional 
independent stimulus beyond that provided by the initial Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Ken 
Chay used the fact that the EEOA had a predictably different impact across industries and 
between the South and the non-South as a way to estimate the economic consequences 
for blacks of this strengthening in the federal antidiscrimination law.
106   Prior to 1972, 
Title VII’s prohibition against employment discrimination only applied to firms with 25 
or more employees.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) of 1972 lowered 
this threshold to include employers with 15 to 24 employees.  Moreover, many states 
already had fair employment practice (FEP) laws that covered these employers, so if the 
legal prohibition in these states was as effective as the federal prohibition, then the EEOA 
would be redundant in those states.  Of the nine states that did not have FEP laws before 
1972, eight were in the South.   
Chay analyzes CPS data for the years 1968-1980 in order to assess the relative 
trends in black and white earnings at the two-digit industry level.  Using the fraction in 
each industry-region employed by establishments with fewer than 25 employees (note: 
this is not limited to 15-24 employee establishments), Chay is able to divide the 
industries into three groups for both the South and the non-South: industries with high, 
medium, and low fractions of workers in establishments with fewer than 25 employees.  
Chay’s “treatment group” consists of the high fraction group (H-Group) industries in the 
South, since these were assumed to be the most affected by the EEOA.  The low fraction 
(L-Group) industries are essentially considered unaffected by the EEOA and serve as the 
control group.  
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  Chay estimates the share of black employment by industry, region (South or one 
of five non-South regions), and year while controlling for region-specific economic 
measures, black-white relative demographic characteristics, and a time trend.
107  The 
variables of interest are the post-policy effects for each region-industry group, which 
were defined to equal zero before March 1973 and are captured by a trend term 
thereafter.  Chay calculates two estimates: 1) a difference-in-differences estimator 
comparing the post-policy changes for the South H-Group to the changes for the South L-
Group; and 2) a “triple differences” estimator that compares the difference-in-differences 
estimate (H-Group vs. L-Group) for the South relative to the one for the non-South.  Both 
sets of estimates indicated that the relative employment of blacks grew more after March 
1973 in industries and regions with a greater proportion of small firms.
108  Chay 
concludes from this that the EEOA strongly increased relative black employment shares 
and earnings: “black employment shares grew 0.5 – 1.1 log points more per year and the 
black-white earnings gap narrowed, on average, 0.11 – 0.18 log points more at newly 
covered than at previously covered employers after the federal mandate.”  The evidence 
on the increasing relative wages of blacks is important to help exclude the possibility of 
white disemployment or simple black re-shuffling of employment.  As a result, Chay 
concludes that the EEOA increased the demand for black workers among small 
employers not previously covered by FEP laws. 
The Chay paper is persuasive, and in fact may understate the boost to black 
employment from the 1972 law for two reasons.  First, Chay’s control group contains 
some employers who had 15 to 24 employees, and were not covered by a state 
antidiscrimination law.  Thus, Chay’s control group would contain some employers who 
shared whatever impact the EEOA had on black employment.  Second, by the mid-1970s, 
the Supreme Court had interpreted Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as 
providing another federal remedy for intentional discrimination without any explicit 
exemption for small firms.  Both of these factors would lead Chay’s estimates to 
understate the true impact of the law. 
 
C.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
1.  Did the CRA Alter Terminations of Black and Female Workers? 
In the summer of 1989, the Supreme Court cut back on a previous holding that 
enabled blacks to sue under §1981 for compensatory and punitive damages when 
discharged because of their race.  While discriminatory discharges continued to be 
unlawful under Title VII, the 1989 decision meant that, such discharged blacks were 
limited to remedies of reinstatement and back pay until the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
restored the pre-1989 law on this issue.  This Act also gave workers dismissed (or 
otherwise discriminated against) because of their sex the right, for the first time, to seek 
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compensatory and punitive damages for such dismissals (although the damages that such 
sex discrimination cases could generate were subject to caps depending on the size of the 
discriminating firm’s workforce).  Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer have tried to explore 
different effects generated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (henceforth “CRA”) by 
examining whether the elevated penalties for discriminatory discharge might have altered 
employer behavior in predictable ways.  If it is costly to fire minority and female 
employees because of legal restrictions such as federal and state antidiscrimination laws, 
then firms will have an incentive to find ways to get rid of ex post low-productivity 
protected workers that circumvent the legal prohibitions.  Oyer and Schaefer (2000) 
suggest that one possible mechanism is to try to push such workers out the door in the 
course of a larger layoff, and if this strategy lowers the cost of discharge one might 
expect to see more firms relying on this approach as federal and state antidiscrimination 
laws become more stringent.  To test this proposition, Oyer and Schaefer posit that the 
CRA would have increased employer concern about discharging minority and female 
workers and might prompt the hypothesized effort to use layoffs to avoid litigation.   
 
The major findings of the paper are that: 
a)  black male full-time workers aged 21-39 were more likely to be fired than 
comparable non-Hispanic white men during the period from 1987 to 1991 (before 
the CRA of 1991 went into effect), but that this differential disappears over the 
period 1992-1994 (after the legislation).  The paper notes, “These estimates are 
strongly consistent with our model’s prediction that the firing rates of protected 
workers should go down when the potential costs of wrongful discharge litigation 
go up.”  
b)  Among the black workers who were involuntarily separated from their jobs, the 
proportion fired went down by more than a third after the CRA of 1991 went into 
effect.  The suggestion is that firms were shifting away from firing blacks to 
terminating them during layoffs: “While the overall rate of displacement for 
protected workers was unaffected by the law, the share of involuntary 
displacements coming in the form of firings fell significantly.” 
 
Layoffs provide a great opportunity to unload dead wood of any kind (with an added 
advantage of getting rid of protected workers who might sue if discharged for cause).  
But loading up the layoff with too high a percentage of blacks might draw the attention of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers too readily.  Oyer and Schaefer note a finding that would seem to 
buttress their theory of the causal impact of the CRA of 1991:  they find no effect on 
relative firing of blacks in California but do in the rest of the country.
109  This is 
supportive because California had a very generous state antidiscrimination law 
throughout the 1987-1994 period, so one would not have expected the effective legal 
regime in California to be significantly impacted by the CRA of 1991.  That is, if because 
of the application of state law, California employers were already subject to the full 
penalties for terminating blacks throughout the study period, then no shift in minority 
termination behavior should have been observed after 1991.  The fact that such a shift is 
not seen in California but is seen outside California lends credence to the claim that the 
1991 change in federal antidiscrimination law has influenced termination patterns. 
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It should also be noted that Oyer and Schaefer’s before and after comparisons of 
the impact of the CRA are not entirely pristine because of certain judicial decisions in the 
pre-CRA period that were alluded to above.  Federal antidiscrimination law afforded a 
somewhat restricted set of remedies to victims of race discrimination (damages limited to 
back pay and no right to jury trial) between 1965 (the effective date of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 1976, when the Supreme Court ruled that a suit alleging 
intentional racial discrimination could be brought under a law passed at the end of the 
Civil War (Section 1981) without these restrictions.  Thus in 1976, blacks could get to a 
federal court jury if they alleged intentional racial discrimination and sought not only 
back pay, but compensatory and punitive damages without limit.  The Supreme Court 
then cut back on the sweep of the 1976 ruling in the June 1989 case of Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, which “held that claims of racial harassment on the job are not 
actionable under sec. 1981 and indicated that many promotions do not amount to the 
making of a new contract.  Further, its decision clearly suggested that discharge for racial 
reasons is also outside the statute’s purview.”
110  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 then 
restored the pre-Patterson interpretation of Section 1981.   
If the Patterson case had been decided before the pre-CRA data period used by 
Oyer and Schaefer, then their conceptual approach of defining a before/after comparison 
of the legal regime relevant to blacks would provide a clean test of their hypothesized 
effects.  Instead, for the period from 1987 to mid-1989, the predominant view of the 
Section 1981 law concerning discriminatory discharge on grounds of race was exactly the 
same as the legal regime after 1991.
111  Perhaps then, a more precise test of the Oyer-
Schaefer hypothesis would only compare mid-1989 to 1991 as the “before” period to 
post-1991 as the “after” period.  The bottom line is that the before and after comparisons 
are likely muddied because of the way in which the law concerning race discrimination in 
employment was weakened by the Supreme Court in 1989 and then restored by Congress 
in late 1991.   
 
2.  Did the CRA Affect Black and Female Employment Levels? 
In another paper, Oyer and Schaefer compare CPS data for 196 three-digit SIC 
code industries for two four-year periods prior to the passage of the CRA of 1991 (1983-
86 and 1988-91) and for the period from 1993-96 to determine if the CRA affected the 
employment of blacks and women.
112  The basic conclusion is that in the years leading up 
to the CRA of 1991, industries with relatively few women and blacks had been increasing 
their share of such workers (if one compares data from 1983-86 with that from 1988-91) 
but that this trend fades if one looks at data from 1993-1996.  It is not all that surprising 
that the CRA did not enhance black employment since the only real changes it 
effectuated for blacks was the restoration of the law that had existed in June of 1989 with 
respect to discriminatory discharge and the standards for employer justification of 
practices with disparate racial impacts.  The disparate impact standard (used to attack 
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111 Oyer and Schaefer recognize that their pre-CRA of 1991 period essentially divides into a pre-Patterson 
(pre-June 1989) period and a post-Patterson period.  During the pre-Patterson period, the majority of 
federal courts permitted section 1981 wrongful discharge claims, which were then extinguished when 
Patterson was decided before being restored by the CRA of 1991.  If by 1987 employers fully anticipated 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson, then the Oyer-Schaefer pre-post comparison would be pristine. 
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neutral acts that have an adverse impact on protected workers) was stringent until mid-
1989, then virtually eviscerated by the Ward’s Cove decision, and eventually restored by 
the CRA of 1991.  Once again, though, the major difference in the law concerning racial 
discrimination was between mid-1989 – 1991 versus the end of 1991 on (when the CRA 
went into effect), so the Oyer-Schaefer comparison is somewhat muddied. 
Moreover, to the extent that the boom of the 1990s was disproportionately driven 
by white and Asian males harnessing the opportunities of the internet, Oyer and 
Schaefer’s finding that relative black employment growth slowed in the post-1991 period 
may be more the product of overall economic trends than the consequence of law.  Note 
that, in any event, Oyer and Schaefer show, in their Table 2, that the percentage of blacks 
in overall employment was 7.8 percent for 1988-1991 as well as for the period 1993 - 
1996, so that there was no “reversal” in black employment, even if there was a slowing of 
gains observed across the time periods in the 1980s.  For women, the small percentage 
decline from 39.8 to 38.9 again may be more a product of internet-driven growth in male 
employment than a law-driven reversal in the hiring of protected workers.
113  Thus, while 
I am skeptical that the CRA hurt black and female employment, I agree with one of the 
main themes of the Oyer and Schaefer papers that there is little support for the view that 
the strengthening of federal antidiscrimination law in 1991 stimulated black or female 
employment, as occurred with the federal laws passed in 1964 and 1972.   
 
3.  Did the CRA Change the Frequency of Discharge Complaints? 
Oyer and Schaefer (2002b) present some interesting data on the frequency of 
EEOC complaints (in cases other than failure to hire) across two-digit SIC industries by 
race and gender: “in industries where women and blacks have relatively low 
representation, they file a relatively large number of complaints” per capita.  Might this 
pattern imply that the CRA acted as a drag on employment of protected workers because 
it led to too many wrongful discharge type suits?  One must consider two other 
possibilities.  First, the possibly adverse impact on female hiring could be caused by the 
sharp increase in sex harassment (rather than wrongful termination) cases after the CRA 
was adopted.  Second, changes in hiring patterns can also be the product of broad 
economic changes rather than legal developments.  Specifically, as Donohue and 
Siegelman (1991) found, industries with lots of discharge complaints likely have large 
numbers of involuntary terminations.
114  Therefore, one might expect that a declining 
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only do this afterwards).  Thus, the pattern of no decline in black employment coupled with a modest 
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114 In general, tight labor markets will reduce employer-initiated terminations and will also reduce the 
likelihood of filing employment discrimination complaints since, under such circumstances, the market 
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and Siegelman (1991, 1993).  History affords an interesting illustration of the claim that employers will 
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industry would experience lots of layoffs, which then lead to increased wrongful 
discharge claims filed by women and blacks (particularly, under last hired, first fired 
approaches).  In other words, the apparently flagging employment of women and 
minorities that Oyer and Schaefer note may be the product of declining industries rather 
than the result of an increased likelihood of discharge litigation induced by the more 
stringent law. 
Oyer and Schaefer (2002a) also explored whether the strengthening of wrongful 
discharge law brought about by the CRA altered the volume of discrimination suits and 
had broader impacts on black and female employment.  They looked at actual EEOC 
filings from 1988 to 1995 and limited their analysis to sex cases brought by white women 
and race cases brought by black males (focusing only on those aged 20-40 to avoid the 
complications of age-based cases).  Roughly 19,000 such wrongful discharge charges 
were filed each year over their eight-year period.  Importantly, they make two very 
interesting points concerning these cases brought by young white women: 1) if one looks 
at cases brought in a single year, the number of complaints brought per employee falls 
with age; so 20-year-old women are most likely to file such complaints and the number 
declines monotonically through age 40 (the last age in their data set); and 2) even though 
the age profile is the same in the years 1990 and 1993, there are substantially more cases 
brought in 1993 (after the adoption of the CRA).  Neither of these facts (the downward 
sloping age-litigation profile and the jump in filings) is found for wrongful discharge 
cases brought by blacks.  Black litigation rates (in terms of EEOC filings) actually rise 
from age 20 – 30 and then are flat or trend slightly down thereafter, and there is no 
obvious difference in filing rates between the two years.  One can only conjecture about 
the reason why young women file wrongful discharge complaints at higher rates than 
somewhat older women.  Might this reflect a harassment effect with the youngest women 
primarily targeted (a common pattern for harassment cases to reach the courts is that a 
harassed female quits and uses the harassment as the basis for a claim of constructive 
discharge)?  Ordinarily, one would expect that older workers would be more likely to sue 
for wrongful discharge since the burdens of dismissal increase with tenure and increased 
acquisition of firm-specific human capital (which is exactly what we see for black males 
at least through age 30).
115 
Oyer and Schaefer note: 
 
The complaint rate is much higher for black men than for white women.  Each 
year, the EEOC received a gender-based wrongful termination claim from 
approximately one out of every 2500 to 3500 employed white women, but the 
proportion is one out of 400 to 600 for black men.
116 
 
The lack of growth in black male wrongful discharge EEOC filings after the CRA is not 
surprising since the only element relevant to such cases that changed in 1991 was the 
increased ability to file Section 1981 discharge cases, which litigants were not required to 
file with the EEOC (since they could proceed straight to federal court).   
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owing to its authorization of compensatory and punitive damages. 
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IX. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX 
 
  During the 1980s and 1990s, the male-female wage gap decreased substantially.  
Darity and Mason (1998), who are generally more sanguine about the impact of federal 
antidiscrimination law on female employment than Oyer and Schaefer, argue that three 
distinct factors contributed to this important change:   
•  First, two opposing trends were in motion.  Men at or below the 78
th 
percentile of the wage distribution experienced absolute decreases in their 
real wage rate.  Meanwhile, women at all points on the wage distribution 
experienced wage increases. 
•  Second, the disparity in the level of human capital for men and women 
was shrinking. 
•  Third, the level of sex discrimination was decreasing. 
Clearly, the fact that women bear children and tend to assume a larger role in child-
rearing than men has an important impact on female labor market decisions and 
outcomes.  Waldfogel (1998) finds that childless women aged 24 - 45 receive 81.3 
percent of a man’s pay whereas women of the same age with children receive only 73.4 
percent.  Waldfogel concludes that this pattern is caused by premarket factors that 
influence employment, as well as discrimination and institutional barriers in the 
workplace.  But, of course, knowing whether and how to respond to this disparity 
requires an understanding of the relative importance of these factors. 
Darity and Mason also contend that the index of occupational dissimilarity for 
both 1970 and 1990 demonstrates strong evidence of occupational crowding by gender.  
Although this index has decreased from 68 percent
117 to 53 percent over this twenty-year 
period, women are still highly concentrated in lower-paying jobs.  Blau and Kahn (1996) 
looked at the economic performance of women in nine OECD countries and drew the 
following interesting conclusions:  1) in terms of human capital and occupational 
distribution, U.S. women compare favorably with women from the other countries; 2) the 
U.S. has had a longer commitment to employment equality; but 3) the U.S. gender gap in 
wages is larger than in any other country.  Darity and Mason interpret this evidence as 
implying that the gender wage gap is governed by the overall degree of inequality in the 
national economy.  Since the U.S. has a high level of income inequality, the wage gap 
will be high despite the existence of strong antidiscrimination measures.  In the case of 
the United States, a decentralized system for setting wages, a low minimum wage 
mandate, and weak trade unions account for the greater inequality in wages in the U.S.  
Thus, policy measures other than enhanced antidiscrimination enforcement might have a 
greater impact on the earnings differential between male and female workers.  Of course, 
as John Rawls argued, we don’t want to enforce greater equality at the expense of those 
at the low end of the income distribution.
118 
Darity and Mason’s discussion is largely focused on the over-representation of 
women at the low end of the earnings spectrum in the labor market.  What more can be 
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said about the under-representation of women at the high end of the market?  The CRA of 
1991 created the Glass Ceiling Commission whose mission was to identify “invisible, 
artificial barriers that prevent qualified individuals from advancing within their 
organization and reaching full potential.”
119  The Commission hoped to explain 
phenomena such as the 90 percent male share of top managers at Fortune 500 companies.   
A recent survey of 120 CEOs, who were predominately male, and 705 female executives, 
who at the time held positions at the level of vice president and above at major 
corporations, illustrates the expressed beliefs of CEOs and high-ranking female 
executives about why so few women make it to the very top of the business pecking 
order.
120  The authors highlight the following survey results: 
 
•  Female executives responded that the following barriers exist: exclusion from 
informal networks, stereotyping, lack of mentoring, shortage of role models, 
commitment to personal or family affairs, lack of accountability in their position, 
and limited opportunities for visibility in the workplace. 
•  CEOs responded that the primary barriers for women workers were ineffective 
leadership and lack of appropriate skill sets for senior management positions. 
•  79 percent of the female executives and 90 percent of the CEOs responded that 
the primary obstacle to gaining a top-level position is women’s lack of line 
experience.  According to the survey, women do not find themselves on the 
trajectory for senior management positions because they are not aware that such 
positions are available to them or they are discouraged from pursuing these roles 
by colleagues and superiors who do not feel that women can perform well in 
them.  As a result, these women simply are not on the radar screen when 
succession decisions are made because they do not have the profit-and-loss 
experience that CEOs most value. 
•  Two-thirds of the female executives and more than 50 percent of the CEOs 
responded that a key barrier for women is the failure of senior leadership to 
assume accountability. 
•  Less than 1/3 of the total respondents considered a lack of desire by women to 
reach senior level positions to be a barrier to women’s advancement. 
•  Of those executive women not already at the very top, 55 percent responded that 
they aspire to attain the most senior leadership positions. 
 
The article closes with the suggestion that current CEOs must alter business 
strategies and human resources agendas to ensure that their female workers can gain the 
appropriate skill sets for senior level positions.  These results helpfully describe what 
some highly talented individuals state is the problem, but, of course, in light of the public 
relations sensitivity on the part of the CEOs and the potentially self-serving responses of 
the female executives, one must be cautious before accepting these statements as having 
established the truth of the matters asserted.   
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http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/GlassCeilingAbout%20the%20Co
mmission.pdf 
120 Wellington et al. (2003). 
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Many of the survey comments suggested that women experienced disparate 
treatment, which would violate federal antidiscrimination law, but even this is not certain.  
Female executives, for example, apparently feel that they have been excluded from 
informal networks and were not mentored.  Even if the feeling corresponds with reality, 
though, we still cannot conclude that disparate treatment of women had occurred unless 
we know that such mentoring occurred more frequently for men with no greater 
qualifications.  Conceivably, the same percentage of men felt (and were in fact) excluded 
as well.  Note that one of the cited “barriers” to female advancement to top managerial 
positions is “commitment to personal or family affairs,” which would not violate current 
law because it is not a barrier created by employers.  Arguments can be made that 
governmental action may be appropriate to address this situation but 1) this would be 
more a matter of affirmative action for women, rather than antidiscrimination law or 
policy, and 2) one may not want to promote policies that undermine women’s 
“commitment to personal or family affairs.”  
It is unclear whether other aspects of this survey support a Beckerian notion of 
employer animus against having women in top jobs, or a view of statistical discrimination 
based on inaccurate -- or even accurate, if one believes Hakim’s work discussed below -- 
views of female ability and desire for top jobs.  Somewhat over half the women reported 
that they aspired to the highest level jobs.  What was the comparable percentage for men 
(and can we trust the accuracy of self-reported aspirations)?  In any event, one would 
expect that the market would penalize employer animus against women or inaccurate 
statistical assessments.  Again, one might ask why businesses would not have the 
appropriate incentives to encourage this human capital development given the value of 
cultivating top corporate managerial talent.
121  The survey might be thought to give 
support for an externality-based argument for affirmative action: if women saw more top 
corporate female role models, then they would pursue these jobs more assiduously, 
thereby expanding their human capital and the productivity of business.  If so, a firm 
might find that hiring a woman for a top job creates a positive externality by stimulating 
the productivity of other women that will not necessarily accrue to the original hiring 
firm. 
 
A.  Differences in Male and Female Behavior and Preferences 
Other recent academic studies have suggested that the plight of women in the 
labor market is strongly influenced by their own conduct and attitudes existing 
independent of the labor market.  Babcock and Laschever (2003) argue that part of the 
failure of women to earn as much and advance as far as men stems from the fact that 
modern Western culture strongly discourages women from asking and negotiating for 
what they want in their careers.  Specifically, women directly out of an MBA program 
were found on average to earn $4,000 less than their male counterparts in their first jobs 
because men were more adept at negotiating their starting salaries.  This finding appears 
to suggest that the requirements (or at least the goals) of the Equal Pay Act (designed to 
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insure that women receive the same pay as men for identical jobs) are not being met.  The 
finding also suggests that, assuming equal productivities, employers would have an added 
incentive to hire women because they are willing to work for less.  If there is no added 
incentive, then women are not underpaid from the employer’s perspective, either because 
they impose greater costs on employers (either from Beckerian discrimination or perhaps 
because of the expected penalty on the employer imposed by female workers who will 
leave the labor market for child-bearing/child-rearing), or because their modest 
bargaining strategy for a higher salary correlates with lower success on the job.   
Note that an employer could not defend against a wage discrimination lawsuit on 
the ground that women are more likely to leave the workforce for child-rearing, but might 
be able to prevail on the second claim if the employer made individualized 
determinations that particular women did not possess the attributes associated with 
greater productivity.  As a practical matter, however, an employer would be risking 
substantial civil liability by attempting to justify male-female disparities in earnings or 
hiring on this basis, even if they were economically justified.  Note, too, that if culture or 
biology inhibits females from negotiating aggressively, women on average will have less 
success in positions where this trait is rewarded.  There is also some evidence that women 
can be trapped in a Catch-22 situation: those women who do negotiate aggressively may 
be characterized as “pushy or bitchy or difficult to work with,” and thus rejected on this 
basis.
122  In the absence of employment discrimination law, the market would respond to 
such non-productivity-based discrimination with greater gender segregation across firms 
without necessarily impairing the earnings or employment of women if Beckerian, rather 
than search, models of discrimination are correct.  Segregation of women who are highly 
productive but viewed as “pushy” by fellow male workers could conceivably allow the 
firm to profit from hiring female workers without incurring the cost of having male 
workers feel discomfort at working with a pushy female executive.  Query whether the 
existence of employment discrimination law reduces the ability of firms to engage in 
such efficient segregation, thereby impairing the prospects of female workers (and 
lowering male utility).
123 
Catherine Hakim, a sociologist at the London School of Economics, uses 
“preference theory” to argue that, contrary to the implicit premise of antidiscrimination 
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law, women do not have the same work aspirations as men.
124  Hakim reports that men 
are three times as likely as women to view themselves as ‘work-centered.’
125  She 
contends that while women in general want opportunities, they do not want a life 
dominated by work.  According to Hakim, antidiscrimination policy has been premised 
on the inaccurate belief that both men and women desire full-time employment and that 
spouses will take equal shares of home responsibility.  Instead, many women look for 
spouses who can provide them with the opportunity to remove themselves from the 
workforce as much as possible so that they can concentrate on home life.  According to 
Hakim, women simply have different preferences than men and most would rather spend 
time with their families than in the office.  In fact, only one-third of those women in dual-
career families even regard their jobs as central to their identity.  (Query what the 
corresponding percentage would be for men.)  Hakim’s preference theory states that 
“women’s lifestyle preferences tend to determine the pattern of their lives, and that with 
the benefit of equal opportunities, women continue to make choices that are different 
from those made by men.”   
   Some contend that Hakim is expressing an antiquated view of female preferences, 
which themselves have been shaped by the discriminatory practices of the labor market.  
But new social science research conducted by scholars at the University of Chicago 
business school has been offered to support the view that male workers seem to have a 
greater competitive drive, on average, than female workers.
126  In a set of controlled 
experiments involving rewards for solving a maze puzzle, the authors determine that 
competition between women and men tends to degrade the performance of women. The 
experiment, conducted in Israel, consisted of 324 engineering students over a span of 54 
sessions.  The authors targeted engineering students because they wanted women who 
were used to competing with men.  The experiment consisted of five different treatments: 
 
•  Treatment 1: Piece Rate.  Each participant was anonymously paid two shekels 
for each maze solved. 
•  Treatment 2: Mixed Competitive Pay.  A group of three males and three females 
was told that the (anonymous) winner of the contest would be paid twelve 
shekels for each maze solved. 
•  Treatment 3: Mixed Random Pay.  A group of three males and three females was 
told that at random, an anonymous participant would get paid twelve shekels for 
each maze solved. 
•  Treatment 4: Single Sex Competitive Pay.  A group of six males or six females 
with the same setup as Treatment 2. 
•  Treatment 5: Single Sex Piece Rate.  A group of six males or six females with 
same setup as Treatment 1. 
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The authors found that in either mixed or single sex piece rate tournaments (i.e., 
each participant receives two shekels for each puzzle solved), no significant gender 
difference exists.  However, in the mixed tournament scheme in which only one player 
would win, male participants outperformed females.  The increase in this gender gap is 
driven by the competitive performance of males under competitive pay schemes (though 
the performance of men does not differ between Treatments 2 and 4).  When tournaments 
only consist of a single sex, the authors note an increase in the mean performance of 
women and a decrease in the gender gap in mean performance.  Thus, women do in fact 
react to tournament incentives and compete in single sex groups.  But, when women 
compete in a mixed group, they may have negative expectations about their relative 
ability that impair their performance. 
In a second study focused on physical tasks, the same authors found that 
competition enhances the performance of boys but not of girls.
127  140 fourth graders -- 
75 boys and 65 girls -- were tested running on a track both alone and in pairs.  When 
children ran alone, there was no difference in performance between the boys and the 
girls.  However, in competition, boys but not girls improved their performance.
128  The 
authors chose younger subjects in this experiment (compared to an average age of 23 in 
the maze study) to determine if competitiveness is due to socialization or other 
characteristics that develop at a younger age or is instead shaped by the discriminatory 
workplace and is therefore something that could provide a basis for a claim of unlawful 
employment discrimination.  No monetary reward was used in this second experiment in 
order to determine whether males only compete for an extrinsic reward.  These results 
confirmed the authors’ hypothesis that competition has a stronger effect on boys than on 
girls and that the gender composition of the group of competing subjects is important.  
One can imagine that such evidence in an unregulated market could provide yet another 
incentive towards greater sex segregation in the workforce.  The research also suggests 
that certain ways of structuring the environment might be more effective for male, rather 
than female, workers and that, accordingly, an employer who allowed practices to remain 
in place that had this effect might be the subject of a disparate impact analysis.  In such a 
case, the employer could be found to have violated Title VII unless the employer could 
establish that the practice was sufficiently justified by business necessity. 
In his remarks at National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Conference on 
Diversifying the Science and Engineering Workforce, Lawrence Summers, the President 
of Harvard, enraged some when he suggested that the relatively small number of women 
to reach the very top levels in the various disciplines of science might have less to do 
with discrimination and more to do with drive or innate ability at the extreme tails of the 
distribution.  After cataloguing potential explanations for disparate female performance, 
Summers concluded that “in the special case of science and engineering, there are issues 
of intrinsic aptitude, and particularly of the variability of aptitude, and that those 
considerations are reinforced by what are in fact lesser factors involving socialization and 
continuing discrimination.”  The point is a general one – if women and men have equal 
mean aptitude but men have higher variance, then there will be more men at each tail of 
the distribution.  Employment as, say, a physicist at Harvard means that someone is at the 
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far right tail of the distribution.  It has long been observed that men in general seem to 
have higher-variance life outcomes (men have more Nobel prizes but also more suicides, 
deaths due to homicide, and spells of incarceration), so the higher-variance hypothesis is 
worthy of consideration.     
John Tierney of the New York Times used Scrabble rankings as an indication that 
men were willing to put in prodigious effort to reach the top of a ranking scheme at a 
higher rate than women, even when the number of overall Scrabble players in the country 
included more women than men.  Tierney, picking up on the work of Fatsis (2001), noted 
that to join the Scrabble elite, intelligence and fluency with words is not enough:  “you 
have to spend hours a day learning words like “khat,” doing computerized drills and 
memorizing long lists of letter combinations, called alphagrams, that can form high-
scoring seven-letter words.”  But he then cites the work of anthropologist Helen Fisher to 
establish the fact that men will be much more likely to engage in such behavior because 
of an evolutionary predilection.  Thus, “women don't get as big a reproductive payoff by 
reaching the top.  They're just as competitive with themselves - they want to do a good 
job just as much as men do - but men want to be more competitive with others.” 
The National Scrabble Association is the official organization for nearly 10,000 
competitive Scrabble players, which supervises over 180 tournaments in the United 
States and Canada, including the National Scrabble Tournament held every other year.  
Before each official tournament, a new rating is calculated for each participant. This 
score, which currently ranges from 400 to 2100, is intended to serve as a relative 
benchmark with higher ratings indicating higher skill levels.  As of June 2005, only 6 of 
the top 100 ranked Scrabble players are female, with the highest ranked at 45 (the others 
are ranked at 46, 48, 72, 89 and 100).  A player’s ranking simply represents their position 
in the national list of player ratings.  The #1 player (David Gibson) has a rating of 2065 
and #100 (Gail Wolford) has a rating of 1810.  As Table 2 indicates, overall gender 
representation at the last two National Tournaments has been fairly even.  But, 
interestingly, the premier Division 1 is dominated by male players (113 men versus 17 
women in 2002; 145 men versus 25 women in 2004), while the middle divisions are more 
evenly matched, and women tend to outnumber men in the lower divisions.  Once again, 
we see significant gender disparities at the most elite level of competition, even in an area 
involving a skill where women would not appear to be disadvantaged (and might even 
have an advantage).  While it is unclear whether this results from some greater 
competitive drive or some other human capital trait, it is hard to see how discrimination 
could play a significant role in success in the National Scrabble Tournament.   
  
B.  Sex Harassment  
After the CRA of 1991 provided the first monetary remedy for this cause of action 
at the federal level, the total number of federal sex harassment cases rose sharply until 
1995 and has since remained roughly stable.  A number of studies have tried to estimate 
the prevalence of sex harassment.  A 1995 survey of active duty women in the U.S. 
Armed Forces found that perceived sex harassment was rampant.  The researchers 
distributed 49,003 questionnaires and collected 28,296 responses, of which 22,372 were 
from women.
129  The survey revealed that 70.9 percent of active duty women had faced 
some sort of sexual harassment over the previous year.  Even adjusting for the response 
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rate with the most conservative assumption that none of the women who did not respond 
had perceived sexual harassment, this is still a strikingly large perceived level of 
harassment, which has been corroborated by a second set of studies conducted by the 
U.S. Merit Systems Protections Board in 1980, 1987, and 1994.  In 1994, 13,200 surveys 
went out to federal employees, with 8,000 returned; the results suggested that 44 percent 
of female employees and 19 percent of male employees had faced sexual harassment over 
the previous year.  In 1980, the figures were 42 percent of women and 15 percent of men, 
while in 1987 the figures were 42 percent of women and 14 percent of men.
130  One 
might be tempted to interpret this time-series evidence as indicative of the ineffectuality 
of the federal ban on sex harassment, which developed in the 1980s and was bolstered by 
the enhanced capacity to secure damages in the CRA of 1991.  This conclusion is 
unwarranted, though, in that it fails to appreciate the likely defects of this time-series 
data.  Increased sensitivity to the issue of harassment has occurred over time, so one 
would assume that complaints of sex harassment rose even as the incidence of sex 
harassment declined.   
Grafting the prohibition on sex harassment onto the antidiscrimination regime has 
the benefit of sanctioning clearly undesirable conduct but, of course, comes at a price.  
First, as this paper has stressed, litigation-based enforcement schemes are costly and 
subject to Type I and Type II errors.  The social loss from high Type II errors (failing to 
punish actual harassers) is mitigated to the extent that the costly litigation does put at 
least some burden on wrongdoers.  Nonetheless, Type II errors in sex harassment cases 
likely impose a considerable psychic if not monetary burden on victims -- the monetary 
burdens of the unsuccessful suits fall on the plaintiff’s attorneys who typically get paid 
only when they win.  Of course, without the legal prohibition, all wrongdoers go free.  
High Type I errors impose all of the same litigation costs but wrongfully sanction 
innocent conduct, which can have an inhibiting effect on unobjectionable workplace 
conduct (as workers try to avoid anything that might be misconstrued as harassment, 
presumably reducing both some unpleasant, albeit non-harassing conduct but perhaps 
also reducing some pleasant and desired conduct).  Moreover, if hiring a woman has 
some chance of imposing an erroneous large monetary penalty plus the stigma of sex 
harassment liability, that prospect will serve as another burden associated with hiring 
American workers in general and women in particular.   
Second, there is the doctrinal issue of whether the sex harassment claim should be 
an independent tort or linked to antidiscrimination law where it does not always fit 
comfortably.  Thus, we see an increasing number of sex harassment claims brought by 
men, many of which are same-sex harassment cases where the reason for the harassment 
may stem more from sexual orientation than from gender.  Moreover, the sex 
discrimination framework fits uncomfortably when a boss harasses both male and female 
employees, which is not unknown since some harassers harass anyone over whom they 
can exert power. 
 
X. DISCRIMINATION IN CREDIT AND CONSUMER MARKETS 
 
  A.  Housing and Credit Markets 
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   As noted previously, Congress enacted a number of statutes in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s extending the reach of antidiscrimination law beyond employment, public 
accommodations, and schooling.  The Fair Housing Act (FHA), passed in 1968, prohibits 
housing providers and lending institutions from discriminating against consumers based 
on race, religion, sex, national origin, familial status or disability.  The Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974 made it illegal, inter alia, for the extension of credit to 
be influenced by the racial composition of a neighborhood, and the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975—later amended in 1989—mandates that lenders report 
information on their lending activity and the disposition of individual applications.  The 
HMDA has generated voluminous data that has been mined by researchers seeking – and, 
according to Kenneth Arrow, finding -- evidence of discrimination in lending practices. 
  HMDA data has been subjected to regression analysis designed to detect disparate 
treatment by showing that being a member of a protected class significantly reduces the 
probability of obtaining fair terms of trade after controlling for legitimate measures of 
creditworthiness, such as income, credit history, and existing debt.
131  At the same time, 
audit studies have attempted to reveal discriminatory business practices in housing and 
lending as they occur.   
Yinger (1998) and Heckman (1998) stress that both standard regression and audit 
studies have strengths and weaknesses.  Either omitting necessary explanatory variables 
or including “illegitimate” controls can influence the ultimate findings of regression 
studies concerning the presence or absence of discrimination.  However, as mentioned 
above, audit studies can also be marred by errors in design and management.  For 
example, the decision to inform the auditors about the study’s objectives or about the 
presence of his or her partner may influence their behavior and survey responses in ways 
that are likely to support a finding of discrimination if one assumes that test auditors 
would likely sympathize with the goals of the antidiscrimination organizations that 
usually initiate audit tests.  Moreover, audit studies are typically narrower in focus than 
regression analysis; they highlight discrimination in isolated stages of economic 
transactions rather than reveal the experience of the average member of a protected class 
who may learn to find more reliable trading partners in active, competitive consumer 
markets.
132  Also, with the partial exception of the housing context where repeated 
studies have been undertaken, audit studies are not generally available in time series, 
which limits their usefulness in analyzing changes over time.  As a result, inference and 
interpretation based on either type of study requires explicit consideration of their 
competing advantages and disadvantages. 
  Schafer and Ladd (1981) used data on mortgage applications in California during 
1977-1978 and in New York from 1976-1978 to estimate the differential probabilities of 
loan denial by race, sex and marital status.  Controlling for an array of variables, 
including loan-to-value ratio, income of secondary earners and neighborhood effects, 
Schafer and Ladd estimated that black applicants were anywhere from 1.58 to 7.82 times 
as likely to be denied loans as white applicants.  Interestingly, they found that the 
disparate treatment of women subsided over time, whereas for minorities the trend 
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seemed to persist.  After the 1989 expansion of the HMDA, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston analyzed newly available data containing all the components of a lender’s 
information set at the time of the loan decision.
133  The resulting study -- published as 
Munnell et al. (1996) -- found that even the rich set of controls could not fully explain the 
differential treatment experienced by blacks and whites.  The paper concluded that blacks 
experienced a denial rate that was almost twice as high as that for similarly situated 
whites. 
  A number of criticisms have been leveled against the Boston Fed finding of 
discrimination in the market for mortgages.  Some (incorrectly, according to Ross and 
Yinger, 1999) argued that coding errors could account for the results, while others, such 
as Stengel and Glennon (1994), attacked the Boston Fed’s model specification.  The 
debate has continued with Kenneth Arrow concluding that statistical discrimination was 
clearly present and Bostic (1996) and others continuing to argue against findings of 
discrimination.  Specifically, Becker (1995) stated: “Some of the evidence found by the 
Boston Fed contradicts their claim of discrimination against minorities. For example, 
average default rates found in this study were about the same on loans in census tracts 
with a large percentage of blacks and Hispanics as in predominantly white tracts. Yet if 
the banks had been discriminating against minority applicants, default rates on loans to 
minorities should have been lower than on loans to whites, since banks discriminate in 
part by accepting minority applicants only with exceptionally good credit histories and 
employment records. They would reject marginally qualified minority applicants while 
accepting marginal white applicants.” 
Berkovec et al. (1996) and others have tried to follow Becker’s suggestion by 
further examining the rate of loan default by race in order to detect or disprove 
discrimination in lending behavior.  As Becker noted, taste-based discrimination would 
lead institutions to set higher credit thresholds for minorities, thereby decreasing their 
probability of default relative to white borrowers.  Results that point to higher minority 
default rates have therefore been interpreted as evidence against discrimination.  As Ladd 
(1998) cautions, however, the use of default data is subject to important methodological 
limitations.  She argues that, unlike the loan application data, which includes the full set 
of factors used by the lender when deciding to approve or deny, default data necessarily 
omits unobserved factors that contribute to the probability of default.  Such unobserved 
heterogeneity, which can influence the probability of default in both directions, has made 
it difficult to generate an unassailable conclusion about the existence or nonexistence of 
discrimination from default data. 
  Using data from the 1989 Housing Discrimination Study, Yinger (1995) probes 
the severity of discrimination by examining the rate at which members of racial groups 
learn about housing opportunities through market interaction.  He finds, consistent with 
discrimination, that “black home buyers learn about 23.7 percent fewer houses than do 
their white teammates, [and] black renters learn about 24.5 percent fewer 
apartments…”
134  These results imply that in addition to the psychic costs of 
discrimination blacks suffer, they are also burdened by higher search costs and the 
consequent potentially inferior housing. 
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  A recent study by Han (2002) that Ross (2003) references may reconcile the 
apparently contending positions in the issue of mortgage lending discrimination.  
Reanalyzing the Boston Fed data, Han shows that there are distinctly different patterns 
between applicants who have a credit history and those who do not.  In the former case, 
lenders seem to treat applicants equally across races since they have valid information on 
which to make their decisions.  In the case where the applicants have no credit history, 
however, strong racial differences are found.  Han concludes that since blacks in the first 
category had significantly worse credit histories than did whites, lenders make similar 
assumptions about applicants without credit histories and therefore assume blacks are 
worse credit risks and treat them accordingly.  This is precisely what Arrow concluded – 
that there is statistical discrimination against blacks.  At the same time, if the statistical 
judgments are correct on average then the lending firms are not making greater profits on 
the loans that they do make to black applicants – which is Becker’s point.  In essence, 
Becker is emphasizing his belief that there is no taste-based discrimination against black 
mortgage applicants, while Arrow is emphasizing that there is still statistical 
discrimination against such applicants (although Han would suggest, only at the point 
where richer credit information is not yet available to the lenders).  Of course, Arrow 
would be correct in noting that such statistical discrimination against black applicants 
would be unlawful.  Becker would likely reply that such conduct shouldn’t be banned 
since on average blacks are being treated fairly (and that credit is being allocated and 
priced more efficiently with such statistical discrimination than it would be without it). 
  Ross and Yinger (2002:310) argue that lenders who appear to be following a 
legitimate lending model based on neutral lending criteria that do not include applicant 
race can still disadvantage black applicants considerably.  This can occur if these lending 
schemes: 
 
“exploit the correlation between many credit characteristics and minority 
status to create underwriting weights that serve to help identify minority 
applicants, not just to measure the impact of credit characteristics on loan 
performance.  We show that the only way to rule out disparate-impact 
discrimination is to make sure that every element of a scoring scheme 
improves the ability of the scheme to predict the performance of the 
applicants within a group (among whites, for example).  More research is 
needed to determine whether the elements of existing scoring schemes 
meet this test, but we use existing default data to show that disparate-
impact discrimination generated by these schemes could severely limit 
minority households’ access to credit under some circumstances.” 
  
 
 B.  Auto  Sales 
  Ayres (1991, 1995) and Ayres and Siegelman (1995) have also used the audit 
approach to document the presence of discriminatory pricing in automobile sales.  
Carefully controlling for observable differences between audit pairs and instructing 
auditors on precise bargaining tactics, Ayres and Siegelman collected data from 306 
cases at Chicago car dealers.  They found that black, male customers paid approximately 
$1,000 more for cars than white men and black females paid $405 more than white   66
males.  Additional results from these car sales audit studies suggest that discriminatory 
practice does not depend on the race of firm employees and that car dealers statistically 
discriminate by assuming that black men and all women have higher reservation prices 
than white males.
135   
Goldberg (1996) uses regression analysis of Consumer Expenditure Survey data 
from 1983 to 1987 to argue against the claim of discrimination in auto sales prices by 
arguing that car dealers did not significantly reduce the price of cars below list value for 
white males relative to minorities or women.  Goldberg’s sample of nearly 1,300 
households included less than 5 percent minority males or females, which is probably a 
smaller amount of data than one would ideally like to have in resolving such an important 
question.  Moreover, Goldberg’s paper is not necessarily in direct conflict with the 
findings of Ayres and Siegelman because of their different geographic focus (national 
versus Chicago) and units of observation (households versus individuals).  Finally, as 
Siegelman (1998) notes, 
 
 “Even though Goldberg (1996, 624) characterized her results as ‘quite different 
from the ones reported by . . . Ayres and Siegelman,’ … Goldberg's estimates of 
the discriminatory premiums paid by white females and ‘minority’ females are 
virtually identical to ours.  The only difference … is that Goldberg found black 
males paying a much smaller premium than we did, and none of her results are 
statistically significant, whereas ours were, at least for the black testers. Because 
there are at least six dimensions on which our audit data allowed for more precise 
measurement and better controls than the survey Goldberg used, her failure to 
obtain statistically significant results is not surprising and should not be taken as 
evidence against the existence of discrimination in new car sales.” 
 
XI. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND RACIAL PROFILING 
 
As crime fell starting in the early to mid-1990s, the ACLU launched a highly 
successful campaign designed to reduce racial profiling in all aspects of American 
policing -- from drug enforcement by state troopers and customs and immigration 
officials to the implementation of the death penalty to local policing efforts to disrupt 
gang activity and simply to enforce motor vehicle laws and criminal law more generally.  
Racial profiling became a contentious political issue, and a number of prominent cases of 
apparent police targeting -- frequently of African-American men -- led to numerous 
consent decrees and massive increases in the number of departments that collect and 
retain data designed to ascertain whether their policing strategies were infected by 
discrimination.  Again, some argued that any disparity in arrest rates across groups 
should be taken as evidence of discrimination but this, too, is simply another example of 
the gap between proof of discrimination and evidence of disparities that was discussed 
earlier.   
One pattern that exists in certain towns in the United States that has contributed to 
this racial profiling litigation is that a largely white suburban area with single family 
homes is changed in ethnic or racial composition when a low income housing project is 
built in the town.  Suddenly, arrests rise sharply and on a per capita basis, arrests are far 
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more numerous in the high-density area than in the single family part of town.  Because 
of the racially diverse compositions of the two areas, however, evidence of strong 
statistically significant disparities in arrests rates by race are quickly marshaled as 
evidence of intentional discrimination. 
Ideally, tests for discrimination would develop a behavioral benchmark that 
corrects for the underlying rate of participation in illegal conduct, which for many crimes 
is all but impossible.  But what if it is shown that blacks commit X percent of a particular 
crime but make up substantially more than X percent of the arrests for that crime?  This 
pattern could be consistent with intentional race discrimination, but it also could be the 
product of a neutral practice having a disparate impact.  Consider the case where a war 
breaks out between two gangs vying to gain control over the crack trade in an inner city 
environment.  If the city responds to the mayhem by flooding the area with police, the 
ability of the police to observe criminal activity in the inner city area will be elevated and 
may well lead to higher arrests across the board for the residents of the targeted inner city 
area, who may happen to be members of a racial or ethnic minority.  The effect may be 
that the arrest rate data that are now being routinely collected may seem to show bias on 
the part of police because of the disproportionate arrest rates of minorities.  Ironically, to 
the extent that the added police activity dampens crime in the flooded area, the benefits of 
the policing may be disproportionately targeted on law-abiding minority members of the 
community -- even though the political rhetoric may all focus on the discriminatory 
conduct of the police.
136  Still, where sentences for identical behavior can vary 
dramatically based on prior convictions, there is a concern about the consequences of 
severe disparate racial impacts in arrests. 
One can imagine a model in which officers have an opportunity to seek 
contraband or detect criminals by engaging in certain policing actions, such as stops and 
frisks.  If for whatever reason the success rate in these police encounters is higher when 
blacks are targeted, the police may have an incentive to target blacks more intensively.  
Efficient policing would then focus on blacks until the success rate from an enforcement 
action against the marginal black citizen equaled that against the marginal non-black 
citizen.  Indeed, if, say, blacks are more likely than non-blacks to commit crime, it might 
be rational for the police to focus all their enforcement activity on blacks, since a corner 
solution may actually define the efficient policing strategy in a particular case.   
This is precisely the theoretical approach taken by Knowles et al (2001) in their 
study of motor vehicle searches along a Maryland highway.  Their model of the search 
process includes a continuum of law enforcement officers and drivers, and the latter are 
identified by race {} W B r , ∈ .  All other observable characteristics of motorists are 
bundled into the variable c.  Police officers are free to search vehicles driven by any (c, r) 
profile and do so with probability γ(c, r) but incur a cost of tr.  The event G denotes a 
search in which drugs are found, and thus the expected payoff to the officer is ) , ( r c G P .  
Similarly, drivers receive v(c, r) if they carry drugs and are not searched or –j(c, r) if 
contraband is found.
137  Therefore, their expected payoff is: 
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Knowles et al define the event when tB ≠ tW as racial prejudice since the costs of 
search differ by race.  On the other hand, if γ(B) ≠ γ(W) then there is evidence of 
statistical discrimination.  The equilibrium constructed entails randomization by motorists 
and police.  Setting equation (25) equal to zero, the equilibrium search rate is given by: 
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Officers are willing to randomize whenever r t r c G P = ) , (
* for all c and r.  In the absence 
of a taste for discrimination, the equilibrium probability of guilt is the same for both 
races.  However, since equation (26) does not depend on that probability, black motorists 
will be stopped and searched more often if  
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Note that this inequality is satisfied when the value of transporting drugs is higher or 
when the cost of being found guilty is lower for blacks. 
  Even though data on c and γ
* are not readily accessible by the econometrician, the 
authors test for prejudice by calculating the probability of guilt by race conditional on 
being searched.  If those probabilities are the same for whites and blacks at the margin, 
then there is no evidence to support a racial bias claim.  Such a test could be implemented 
by testing the null hypothesis  
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In order to avoid specification problems with logit and probit models, Knowles et al opt 
for a nonparametric test based on the Pearson χ
2 statistic.   
Their data set includes over 1,500 motor vehicle searches along Interstate 95 in 
Maryland between 1995 and 1999.  Of those searches, 63 percent of the motorists were 
African-American, 29 percent were white and 6 percent were Hispanic.  A first glance at 
the data also revealed that the percentage of African-American drivers searched had 
decreased in the late 1990s, while whites were searched more often in the same time 
period.  
Tests for equality of guilt rates across race (as well as sex, time of day and car 
type) are carried out according to different thresholds for measuring guilt.  Knowles et al 
emphasize the criteria in which any form and amount of illegal substances found 
constitute guilt (Definition 1) or when seizures of less than two grams of marijuana are 
excluded (Definition 2).  When guilt is measured according to Definition 1, the 
hypothesis of equal conditional guilt rates is not rejected for whites and blacks but is for 
Hispanics and the other two race categories.  Similarly, under Definition 2 there is no 
evidence of bias against African-American drivers.  Interestingly, when the definition of   69
guilt includes drugs in large quantities, Knowles et al find potential signs of bias against 
white drivers. 
These results are interpreted as evidence of maximizing behavior on the part of 
law enforcement rather than racial prejudice.  As suggested by their model, differences in 
search rates may arise even without discriminatory preferences.  Indeed, they argue that 
“searching some groups more often than others may be necessary to sustain equality in 
the proportions guilty across groups.” 
In a recent extension of the Maryland search analysis, the model of Persico and 
Todd (2004) allows for heterogeneous payoffs for officers and drivers and then tests for 
bias using data from Wichita.  This version permits drivers a third option of delegating 
criminal activity to a member of another (r, c) group and within each group there is a 
joint probability distribution over v, j and d, the cost of hiring a delegate.  The racial bias 
of police officers p now enters through an extra benefit, B(p), if a successful search 
involves an individual of the minority race.   
If the police are unbiased and both race groups are searched in equilibrium, then 
Persico and Todd note that their respective crime rates must be equal, or κr = κR, where r 
and R represent the minority and majority race, respectively.  However, if B(p) > 0, i.e. 
officers are prejudiced, then it must be the case that the crime rate of the group subject to 
bias is lower, or κr < κR.  Although characterization of equilibrium in this model is more 
complex than in Knowles et al (2001), its implications for empirical analysis are just as 
straightforward.  In fact, the simple analysis above of crime rates carries over into the 
fully specified model of interaction between police and drivers: the hit rate, or the success 
rate of searches, will be equal across races at the margin if police are unbiased, and the 
hit rate of the preferred race will be higher when police are biased. 
Persico and Todd apply this test to over 2,000 vehicle searches between January 
and September 2001 conducted by the Wichita police department.  As in the Maryland 
data, the percentage of blacks searched by law enforcement (32 percent) is higher than 
their share in the population of drivers (11 percent) while the opposite holds for whites 
(63 versus 65 percent).  Their primary finding once again indicates that police officers are 
not biased in their search behavior: the hit rates for whites and blacks were 22.03 percent 
and 22.69 percent.  Indeed, they observe equal hit rates across all three race groups.  
Finally Persico and Todd summarize the results of 16 other city and state-level racial 
profiling studies, which hint at an empirical regularity of no police bias against black 
drivers.  In contrast, Gross and Barnes (2002) conclude from their analysis of the 
Maryland data that the Maryland State Police do use race to decide who to stop and who 
to search.  This disparate treatment stems from the police effort to increase the minute 
percentage of stops that lead to drug seizures, they conclude.  Gross and Barnes view the 
discriminatory treatment to be pointless since it has no discernible impact on the drug 
trade. 
  In general, using race to target policing activity in the absence of a specific racial 
description of a perpetrator will violate constitutional doctrine of equal protection under 
the law, but the disparate impact standard will only govern certain types of policing 
activities – e.g., where Congress has instituted a broader definition of discrimination for 
those departments that receive federal funding.  One consequence of the racial profiling 
movement is that far more data about the racial composition of stops and arrests is now 
collected by the police, which presumably has some opportunity cost since officers must   70
devote time to filling out reports.  In addition, the data is costly to evaluate and does 
create an opportunity for knowingly or unwittingly presenting results that appear to 
demonstrate racial bias when none in fact exists.  The data may be most valuable in 
reining in the misconduct of particularly biased officers, but even then the fear remains 
that these bad apples can avoid detection simply by not filling out the forms when they 
stop but do not arrest blacks.  Procedures are then implemented to address that problem, 
but one can see that rooting out discriminatory conduct is not a trivial task, whether it is 
in the workplace, the police force, or other arena of social life. 
  The massive increase in incarceration of young black men clearly signals a social 
problem, although it may have less to do with discrimination in policing, than with the 
harsh war on drugs.  Even if this war is conducted in a race neutral manner, it will 
enmesh into the criminal justice system a disproportionate number of young males with 
low socio-economic status and fewer options in the legitimate labor force.  Of course, an 
anti-drug policy directed at the demand side (rather than the current supply-side 
approach) would have far less racial impact since blacks make up a much smaller share 
of drug users than of drug sellers.
138  The latest figures show that 12 percent of black men 
aged 20-34 are incarcerated while the comparable figure for white men is 1.6 percent.
139  
No change in policing will radically alter these numbers, although a change in drug 
policy clearly would.  It is worth asking whether our society has done enough to try to 
alter this situation, or whether it is willing to accept such high levels of black 




  We know that discrimination has been an enormous blight on the history of this 
country.  The scholarly consensus is also clear that the enactment of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was a major step towards addressing this problem, and, in particular, aided the 
employment and earnings of blacks relative to whites for the decade from 1965 to 1975.  
This tells us that law was needed to stimulate demand for black labor if society was to be 
true to the ideal that every person should be judged by their talents and not by the color of 
their skin.  The market alone had not given this protection, despite the claims to this 
effect by some very prominent economists, such as Milton Friedman.  Even the 
libertarian Richard Epstein now concedes that the Civil Rights Act was required to break 
the logjam of Jim Crow.  Indeed, to the extent that this federal legislation reduced the 
discriminatory attitudes of southern (and even non-southern) racists, the efficiency gains 
from reducing these Beckerian costs would be enormous.  Just as de Tocqueville writing 
in 1833 understood that slavery was not only cruel to the slave but deeply harmful to the 
masters, federal antidiscrimination law revealed a century and one-half later that lifting 
the oppression of intense discrimination from blacks helped the citizens of the South, 
both black and white, immensely.
140  
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There is much less consensus, though, about where things stand today.  As in so 
many areas of the law -- for example, medical malpractice, which kills more than the 
total victims of homicide and car accidents each year; and antitrust, where the costs of 
egregious acts in restraint of trade can be enormous -- it is easy to point out examples of 
objectionable conduct, but it is also easy to see that a system of private litigation creates 
many problems of costly lawsuits and high rates of error.  The audit studies described in 
Section VI and X remind us that employers and housing agents acting in a discriminatory 
manner are still common, but by no means dominant.  The Urban Institute study of 
Chicago employers found that black and white testers were treated identically 85.8 
percent of the time, while whites were favored in 9.6 percent of the tests and blacks were 
favored in 4.5 percent of the tests.
141  When one compares those figures to the percentage 
of Chicago employers who held negative views about the work ethic of black, white, and 
Hispanic employees (37.7 percent ranked blacks last) one realizes that the combination of 
competition in the market and the existence of employment discrimination law leads to 
much lower effective discrimination than one might fear.
142  Ideally, one would like to 
know the relative importance of law in this equation.  Clearly, the economy is more 
competitive today than ever before, which implies that concerns about employer 
discrimination should be less pressing than might have been true even 20 years ago. 
Heckman may well be correct that efforts to further ratchet up enforcement efforts 
of the current litigation-based system of antidiscrimination law would elevate costs far 
beyond likely benefits.  In his view, the best policy would be to direct resources more 
heavily into education and human capital development rather than further 
antidiscrimination activity or affirmative action, although Loury (2002) argues that the 
full array of approaches will be needed to produce greater racial equality.  It may be 
worth exploring whether it would be sensible to diminish the reliance on private litigation 
and place greater emphasis on programs such as the federal contract compliance program, 
under which government contractors are pressed to be sure to avoid “underutilization of 
women and minorities.”  Such efforts have the potential not only to redress overt 
imbalances in hiring procedures but also to mitigate negative, subconscious attitudes 
about race and sex of which people in positions of authority may not be aware.  As 
suggested by the empirical findings of sociologists and psychologists, latent, negative 
attitudes toward racial minorities have persisted despite decades of antidiscrimination 
legislation.
143  It is therefore likely that the problem of racial discrimination will continue 
to be widespread and difficult to combat.   
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143 The experimental study of implicit attitudes in Cunningham et al. (2001) provides some interesting 
evidence of this phenomenon.  Test subjects were shown faces of black and white individuals on a 
computer screen followed by words that were clearly positive or negative in connotation.  In one trial, 
subjects pressed the same key to identify white faces and “good” words and another for black faces and 
“bad” words.  In a second trial the key for black faces was the same as for good words while bad words 
were identified with the same key as white faces.  Their results revealed a statistically significant slower 
response time in the second trial suggesting stronger associations between the pairings in the first test.  
However, participants scored below the midpoint of the Modern Racism Scale (suggesting lower than 
average levels of racism) based on a questionnaire on explicit attitudes toward race, which indicated a 
disconnect between implicit and explicit feelings.    72
The first phase of federal antidiscrimination law was designed to achieve color 
blind treatment of all workers.  In its second phase, however, antidiscrimination law was 
harnessed as a means of improving the economic status of those who would remain 
disadvantaged in the marketplace by color-blind treatment: blacks, women, Hispanics, 
the elderly, and the disabled.
144  This was done in a way that was, arguably, less socially 
divisive than explicit welfare legislation that could more efficiently target benefits to 
these groups.  Supporters of this implicit affirmative action will assert that it was social 
welfare-enhancing even if no longer efficient and even if somewhat disingenuously 
couched in the language of remedying discrimination (rather than promoting fairness or 
distributive justice).  Over time, however, the opponents of such policies have become 
increasingly unhappy with the perceived excesses of such aggrandized antidiscrimination 
law, and we have begun to witness this trend in recent legislative initiatives designed to 
cut back on affirmative action in education and other governmental functions.
145 
Another goal of antidiscrimination law is to prevent the type of racial and ethnic 
conflagrations that persistently lead to such unhappy consequences around the world.  
Wise antidiscrimination law and policies may serve to dampen down such antagonisms 
and prevent the rigid forms of segregation that can allow biased attitudes to percolate into 
an unhealthy brew.  Richard Posner has speculated that the violence initiated by French 
Muslims in November 2005 resulted from insufficient reliance on American–style 
antidiscrimination and affirmative action efforts.
146  On the other hand, social science 
evidence suggests that when affirmative action programs are pushed too aggressively, 
they can generate angry backlashes.  Finding the correct balance, then, becomes an 
important element of antidiscrimination law and policy.  These tensions are always 
bubbling beneath the surface as evidenced by the fact that Timothy McVeigh, who 
bombed the Oklahoma City federal building, was involved with the Aryan Republican 
Army and supported its white supremacist agenda. 
The economic analysis of law, especially with respect to antidiscrimination 
measures, has endured much criticism for its “reduced form” approach to complex social 
and legal issues.  In his denunciation of the neo-classical paradigm, Ramirez (2004) 
                                                 
144 See Donohue (1994). 
145 As Card and Krueger (2004) noted: “Between 1996 and 1998, California and Texas eliminated the use 
of affirmative action in college and university admissions.  At the states' elite public universities admission 
rates of black and Hispanic students fell by 30-50 percent and minority representation in the entering 
freshman classes declined.”   
146 Posner (2005) states:  “Another factor in the recent French riots may be the French refusal to engage in 
affirmative action. The French are reluctant even to collect statistics on the number of people in France of 
various ethnicities, their incomes, and their unemployment rates. No effort is made to encourage 
discrimination in favor of restive minorities (as distinct from women, who are beneficiaries of affirmative 
action in France) and as a result there are very few African-origin French in prominent positions in 
commerce, the media, or the government. Affirmative action in the United States took off at approximately 
the same time as the 1967 and 1968 race riots, and is interpretable (so far as affirmative action for blacks is 
concerned) as a device for reducing black unemployment, creating opportunities for the ablest blacks to 
rise, promoting at least the appearance of racial equality, and in all these ways reducing the economic and 
emotional precipitants of race riots. Of particular importance, affirmative action was used to greatly 
increase the fraction of police that are black, while the "community policing" movement improved relations 
between the police and the residents of black communities. French police, traditionally brutal, have by all 
accounts very bad relations with the inhabitants of the Muslim slums. The French riots are a reminder that 
affirmative action, although offensive to meritocratic principles, may have redeeming social value in 
particular historical circumstances.”   73
argues that the field of law and economics promotes a “truncated microeconomic analysis 
of race that is founded on what can only be termed pseudo-economics,”
147 citing the 
arguments of Arrow (1998) as justification for his position.  Arrow does indeed believe 
that non-market-based accounts of discrimination such as social networks deserve more 
attention, but this is not to say that economics has little to offer those studying 
antidiscrimination law.  In fact, Ramirez’s skepticism of the field echoes precisely the 
issues that motivated economists like Arrow to formulate alternatives to the Beckerian 
theory of discrimination, such as the models presented in Section III.  There is even 
evidence of the multi-disciplinary approach to discrimination that Ramirez contends are 
woefully missing.
148  Moreover, Ramirez opines that law and economics primarily 
consists of theoretical analysis.  As this chapter has shown, though, empirical studies 
investigating the effect of legal interventions on racial prejudice and the actual behavior 
of economic agents have provided valuable insight into the causes and consequences of 
discrimination. 
Indeed, economic analysis has helped to identify some of the unintended 
consequences of antidiscrimination law, such as the fact that, as employment 
discrimination litigation changed from being largely about failure to hire to being 
primarily about wrongful discharge, the law developed from a tool that opened up new 
areas for minority employment to one that created some incentives against hiring 
minorities.  The potential drag on minority employment resulted from the increased cost 
associated with hiring someone who might need to be fired at a later date.
149  Another 
example concerns the ability of employers to circumvent the demands of law: if a firm 
resides in an area with a 40 percent minority population, it may be able to drastically 
reduce its reliance on black labor by moving to another locale, with a black workforce of 
only, say, 2 percent.  By doing so, both the prejudiced employer and the employer fearful 
of discrimination suits might be able to avoid the psychic or legal burden of hiring blacks 
altogether.  In either event, the goal of increasing opportunities for blacks would be 
thwarted.  Similarly, an impressive recent study has raised concerns about whether the 
“reasonable accommodation” requirements of disability law are harming the employment 
opportunities of disabled workers.
150  More empirical work is needed before we can state 
with assurance the full extent of the costs and benefits of antidiscrimination law in 
employment, housing, lending, medical care, and criminal justice policy. 
                                                 
147 Ramirez (2004). 
148 For example, Lang (1986) proposes a theory of discrimination based on the transaction costs that 
accompany the emergence of distinct language or speech communities in the labor market.  Lang clearly 
states his claim that this idea “is a distinct improvement over the existing theoretical literature on 
discrimination, which either relies on tastes…or on statistical discrimination having implications generally 
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Figure 1 
The Effect of Discrimination on the Wages and Quantity of Black Labor under the 












Quantity of Black Labor 




TABLE 1: MEDIAN INCOME AND NUMBER OF FULL-TIME, YEAR ROUND WORKERS FOR 










  Males 
  1962  1975  1988  2001   
White  29,774  38,374  40,635  40,790   
  -   (34.0)  (42.7)  (50.0)   
Black 17,768  59.7 percent  28,553  74.4 percent 29,786  73.3 percent  31,921  78.3 percent 
  -   (2.8)  (4.1)  (5.5)   
Asian -  -  -  -  40,369  99.3 percent  42,695  104.7 percent 
  -  -  (1.2)  (2.7)   
Hispanic -  -  27,804  -  26,154  61.7 percent  25,271  58.5 percent 
  -   (1.5)  (3.6)  (7.6)   
White, non-Hispanic -  -  -  -  42,364  -  43,194  - 
  -  -   (39.3)    (42.8)   
           
  Females 
  1962  1975  1988  2001   
White  17,793  22,436  27,064  30,849   
  -   (15.1)  (26.3)  (33.4)   
Black 10,858  61.0 percent  21,436  95.5 percent 24,252  89.6 percent  27,297  88.5 percent 
  -   (2.0)  (4.0)  (5.9)   
Asian -  -  -  -  28,536  105.4 percent  31,284  101.4 percent
  -  -   (0.9)    (2.0)   
Hispanic -  -  19,073  -  21,856  79.4 percent  21,973  69.1 percent 
  -   (0.6)  (2.0)  (4.4)   
White, non-Hispanic -  -  -  -  27,521  -  31,794  - 
  -  -   (24.4)    (29.3)   
           
           
             
Notes:             
(a) Data source is the U.S. Census Bureau.          
(b) Full-time workers are defined as persons on full-time schedules include persons working 35 hours    
or more, persons who worked 1-34 hours for non-economic reasons (e.g., illness) and usually work    
full-time, and persons ``with a job but not at work'' who usually work full-time.     
(c) Median income numbers are in 2001 dollars based on the CPI-U-RS price index of inflation.   
(d) The figures in parentheses represent the number in millions of full-time, year round workers making up each group. 
(e) For blacks and Asians, the percentage is the median income compared to the white median income.   
(f) For Hispanics, the percentage is the median income compared to the white, non-Hispanic median income.     86
 
TABLE 2: COUNTS OF MEN AND WOMEN IN THE 2002 AND 2004 NATIONAL SCRABBLE 
TOURNAMENTS  




 Division  1   145   25 
 Division  2       78   56 
 Division  3       80   88 
 Division  4       61   89 
 Division  5       30   59 
 Division  6       26   49 
 Division  7       19   21 
 




Division  1   113   17 
 Division  2       73   29 
 Division  3       54   76 
 Division  4       42   82 
 Division  5       40   70 
 Division  6       25   61 
 
  Total     347   335 
 
Sources: http://www.scrabble-assoc.com/tourneys/2004/nsc/registered.html and http://www.scrabble-
assoc.com/tourneys/2002/nsc/roster.html 
 
 